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ABSTRACT
This paper presents a study of tenant management as a
potential alternative to traditional housing authority
management strategies in urban family public housing. The
history and the current national debate around the issue of
public housing residents taking over management at local
developments is di.scussed to set the framework for assessing
tenant management's viability as a management model.
Three cases of cities where tenant management has been
implemented: Boston, Jersey City, and Washington, highlight
some of the model's potential benefits. Tenant management is
found to be a model that cannot work at every development.
Eight pre-conditions are identified should be considered in
considering a specific site for tenant management: 1)
residents need to want to manage, 2) residents need to be
dissatisfied with current management at the site, 3) there
needs to be organizational potential among residents at the
site, 4) there needs to be at least one leader with the
potential to manage, 5) the local housing authority needs to
be supportive of tenant management, 6) there needs to be money
available for technical assistance, 7) a tight community
fabric at the site is a positive sign, and 8) the commitment
of funding for necessary physical repairs at the site will
facillitate tenant management.
As a result of the study, tenant management was found to be a
preferred model at sites which satisfied the pre-conditions.
Five Boston developments were tested as to their respective
potential. It was recommended that-tenant management be
implemented at one of the five developments.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Phillip L. Clay
Title: Professor of City Planning
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5I. INTRODUCTION
"Simply because we are poor doesn't mean we don't
have pride, respect and dignity. Simply because we are
poor doesn't mean we don't want our children to grow up
like other children.
Believe me, poverty doesn't take those kinds of things
from you. Unfortunately, public housing has taken those
things away from my people because they no longer have
pride. They no longer have self-esteem and self-worth.
They are people who have given up on everything and
everybody, and the system has done that through welfare,
through public housing and through food stamps by making
them feel ashamed to use those programs simply because
they happen to be poor.
At Cochran, we didn't just change the buildings, we
changed the attitudes and the behavior of the people. We
put back into people self-respect and self-esteem, the
things that everybody needs to make them feel like they
are worth something, and we did it through resident
management. And we did it without money or support from
the authority."
-Bertha Gilkey,
Director, Cochran TMC, St. Louis,
HUD Conference, July, 1984
More than two million of the lowest income persons in
this country live in public housing. Although it was not the
original intent of the public housing program outlined in the
Housing Act of 1937, most central city public housing now
provides unsafe, unhealthy, and undesirable living conditions.
The level of neglect and deterioration in public housing
magnifies symptoms of poverty like unemployment, crime, drug
abuse, teenage pregnancy, and an overwhelming sense of
powerlessness, despair and hopelessness. Since the 1960s when
public housing became the so-called "housing of last resort"
for the American poor, federal, state and local policy-makers
have generated an almost endless stream of policy initiatives
and demonstration projects aimed at improving those conditions
in public housing. Prominent among the current strategies is
6the idea of tenants taking over management of responsibilities
and even owning their units. This idea is being promoted by a
broad spectrum of progressives, tenants, by conservative
Reagan administration housing officials, and some local
housing authorities (LHAs).
The idea of tenant management emerged not as a public
policy strategy designed to reverse the downward trends of
poverty and powerlessness, but rather arose in the late 1960s
and early 1970s from within public housing developments, from
tenants themselves, and out of the popular notion that
empowerment of poor people needed to be part of any anti-
poverty strategy. In 1971, the Boston Housing Authority
signed a five-year contract with residents of the Bromley
Heath development in Jamaica Plain, turning over all
management responsibilities. In 1976, a National
Demonstration Project, funded by the U.S. Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD), instituted tenant
management at seven developments around the country. The
experience of these and other tenant-managed developments has
been varied, as outlined below, but has been strong enough to
suggest that not only can the model be replicated elsewhere,
but that it can be part of an integrated strategy to reverse
some of the devastating trends affecting the lives of public
housing residents.
The idea of tenant management has gained new currency in
the 1980s, in a new HUD demonstration project which will
involve six new cities. The demonstration project, which is
being managed by the National Center for Neighborhood
7Enterprise (NCNE), was announced in July, 1985 and will be
financed initially by a $1.9 million grant from the Amoco
Foundation. NCNE President Robert L. Woodson, in announcing
the new initiative declared, "This multi-city demonstration
will build on the dramatic success of public housing resident
management corporations that have reduced crime and welfare
dependency and, at the same time, created jobs for residents."
(NCNE press release, July,1985) The NCNE listed three phases
of its demonstration project in its November, 1985 proposal:
training, economic development and homeownership
opportunities.
The idea of poor people managing their own housing, which
was considered radical only ten years ago, is now getting
widespread consideration. The Reagan administration, for
reasons discussed below, has embraced the idea; tenant
organizations have proposed it; and locally the Boston Housing
Authority (BHA) is considering seriously contracting our
management responsibilities to tenants at some developments.
This study will seize this historic opportunity to take a
closer look at tenant management of public housing by 1)
studying the history and experience of TMCs nationally, 2)
briefly discussing the national debate around tenant
management, 3) looking more closely at cases of tenant
management in Boston, Jersey City and Washington, and 4)
testing the viability of tenant management against measures of
management efficiency and effectiveness.
This thesis will document that tenant management is a
viable model for providing efficient housing management, and
8for empowering public housing residents. It will also
determine the circumstances or pre-conditions which would make
a development a likely site for tenant management. Using that
list of pre-conditions, five large Boston developments with
management problems: Mission Hill, Charlestown, Orchard Park,
West Broadway and Franklin Field will be evaluated in terms of
their potential for tenant management.
9II. WHAT IS TENANT MANAGEMENT?
"If the tenants aren't completely in control its not
worth it. Our new contract stinks, the Rochester Housing
Authority tells us when to go to sleep at night. Boards
should never get in a situation where the housing
authority can tell you what to do. You need a strong
Board and a good contract to take over and manage."
- Doreatha Gayden, Tenant Manager
Ashanti Development, Rochester,
November, 1985 interview
Tenant management is defined in this thesis as the
situation in which management responsibilities are contracted
out to an organized group of residents. In most cases the
management and maintenance positions are held by tenants. It
is not considered tenant management in the case in which the
LHA hires tenants to key management or maintenance staff
positions at local developments. The key distinction is
whether it is the LHA or the TMC which has the contractual
responsibility to manage, and therefore the right to hire and
fire.
What separates tenant management from housing authority
central management is that there is a contractual handing over
of management duties by the LHA to the TMC. The TMCs vary in
structure from case to case, but do include some corporate
entity representing tenants, and a codified democratic
decision-making process. In almost every case of tenant
management all management, maintenance, and rent collection
responsibilities are turned over to the TMC. Direct
accountability for delivery of management and maintenance
flows from the residents to the TMC, either directly or
through a Board of Directors.
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One difference between TMC and LHA management that is
important to consider is that the former requires a
decentralization of management functions at the TMC site.
Management provided by LHAs to local developments usually
consists of centrally trained and supervised staff placed by
and accountable to central LHA administrative staff. Tenant
management requires significant restructuring of LHAs
involved. Some observers of tenant management argue that the
extent of decentralization becomes Mlmost as important in
assessing the model's viability as the effect of tenants
becoming managers. (Kolodny, 1983; Area Director interviews,
1985) The fact that TMCs plan, implement, and make decisions
on site management and maintenance delivery at the local
development is critical to the definition of tenant
management. In cases in which management functions remain
centralized at the LHA and residents are involved can be
called tenant participation but not tenant management.
While tenant management provides a decentralized and
lessened LHA role in management it does not eliminate that
critical role. LHAs retain ownership of the developments and
remain accountable to HUD and to local administrations for the
condition of the housing stock. In different cases of tenant
management LHAs retain responsibilities in rent collection,
accounting, purchasing, payroll, hiring and firing of
maintenance personnel, specific maintenance tasks, eviction
proceedings, union negotiations, and modernization, among
other tasks. LHAs retain different responsibilities in some
cases because they could perform them more inexpensively and
11
efficiently, and in others in order to maintain control in
areas where they doubt the TMC's capabilities. (Kolodny,
1983)
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III. WHO WANTS TENANT MANAGEMENT?
"Within each urban and rural community there are
indigenous strengths and resources. One of the most
valuable resources is the grassroots organization, which
can be used in redesigning and implementing strategies
that will work to eliminate problems in each community.
Policies based on local approaches, where the
beneficiaries play a key role in the social and economic
restitution of their own communities, can replace
ineffective maintenance programs that produce dependency.
Organizations that owe their origin to local initiative
and spirit are much more likely to be successful in
addressing the needs of low-income neighborhoods."
-Introduction to HUD conference on resident
management of public housing, July 1984
This rhetoric promoting tenant management could easily
have been spoken by a tenant leader, a radical housing
advocate, or reform-minded bureaucrat. That it was delivered
at a HUD conference by a conservative Reagan administration
spokesperson illustrates the range of actors advocating for
tenant management. The variety of objectives and self-
interests among advocates of tenant management is as great and
as wide-ranging as the variety among those actors.
Constituencies with shared self-interests, like tenants and
LHAs, as well as ideological groups on the left and right, are
often divided on the issue of tenant management. The breadth
of the public policy debate and the convergence of sharply
divergent ideologies and self-interests on one public policy
alternative warrants discussion and a breakdown of some of the
issues in that debate.
For tenants the opportunity to manage offers both
increased control over their lives and the opportunity to
replace a housing authority management system which they may
13
judge unsatisfactory. For LHAs tenant management has
frequently provided a convenient way to relieve themselves of
unwieldy management situations in developments in extremely
deteriorated condition. A tenant leader in St. Louis
commented, regarding the LHA attitude there, "they were happy
to wash their hands of us; the attitude was 'you want it, you
can have it,'" (Coney interview, Nov. 1985)
In other cases the interest of the LHA can be traced to a
liberal or pro-tenant attitude' of one or more local official.
Tenant leaders at Bromley-Heath cite a combination of the
"hand-washing" goal and the genuine pro-tenant attitude o.f
then-Administrator Ellis Ash as the BHA's goals in supporting
tenant management at that development. (Bromley-Heath
interviews, Nov. 1985) An additional goal which has been
prominent in accounting for LHA willingness to turn over
management responsibilities has been the availability of
external funds which can provide relief to over-extended LHA
budgets. The Amoco Foundation funding of the current HUD
demonstration project is clearly providing a strong incentive
for new interest among LHAs.
The current national administration's goals are far
different from those of the officials who promoted the
original 1970s demonstration project. The goals center not on
empowering poor people, but on reducing the federal role in
housing them. The NCNE demonstration proposal cites tenant
management as the first step in a process which will-lead to
eventual tenant ownership of public housing units. A more
complete analysis of the proposal for tenant ownership of
14
public housing units will not be part of this thesis. It is
however worth noting that tenant ownership relieves HUD and
the federal government of responsibility for continuing to
subsidize those units, and there is evidence to indicate that
this administration is not adverse to budget-cutting by
eliminating the expense of low-income housing.
The idea of tenant management has not been endorsed
universally by all public housing tenants. Not all tenants
want to be managers and many have voted to keep the headaches
and responsibilities of management in the hands of the LHA.
For example, in 1969 residents of Columbia Point in Boston
rejected the opportunity to manage themselves before Bromley-
Heath residents took up the challenge. Another case of tenant
disinterest involved a TMC in Hawaii which returned management
to the LHA after two years of tenant management that most
judged to have been effective. (Diaz, 1979)
It is by no means a universally accepted truism that
tenant management is preferable to other management models,
and there has been continuing debate on both sides. Some of
the arguments in favor of tenant management are: 1) poor
people should be actively involved in solutions to local
problems and should not have to rely on the professionalism of
outsiders, 2) tenants understand those problems and management
issues first-hand and are therefore best equipped to deal with
them, 3) tenants taking responsibility for management will
instill a greater sense of power and control over their lives,
and help reverse the cycle of poverty and despair in the
development communities, 4) managing would give tenants a
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greater stake in their living environment, leading to a safer
more cohesive community, 5) homeownership by public housing
residents is the ultimate goal for which tenant management is
the first step, and 6) where traditional management has failed
LHAs have nothing to lose by turning management over to
residents.
The opposite side of the public policy debate includes
tenants as well as housing authority officials, progressives
as well as conservatives. Some of the arguments against
tenant management are: 1) it creates conflict for TMCs between
the role of manager and the role of tenant organizer and
advocate. (According to a TMC leader at Bromley-Heath, "When
we took over management I had to evict people I had known and
lived with all my life.") (Hailey interview, Nov. 1985); 2)
tenant management is more costly than central management, 3)
its success is often dependent on one or more charismatic,
skilled leaders, and the TMC is doomed if that individual
moves on, 4) tenant management can't work in every situation,
5) tenant management merely relieves LHAs of problems which
they are usually responsible for creating without necessarily
solving them, 6) TMCs tend to be cliquish, undemocratic and
unrepresentative of the rest of the resident population, and
7) tenants are only interested in the most efficient
management model, and as long as the work gets done,
empowerment and control are not important.
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IV. TENANT MANAGEMENT: AN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
"HUD, the Housing Authority and the city did
everything they could do to discourage us because it was
the institutional, professional attitude then that poor
folks, tenants, should be managed, not managing. The other
attitude is the big brother attitude, that we are going to
take care of all of you. You see where we are today? That
comes from them taking care of us.
It is those kinds of attitudes and those kinds of
directions of Congress that have gotten us in this mess.
Don't take care of me. Give me training and the skills,
and I will take care of myself. Teach me how to fish
because the day you are no longer around, I will be able
to feed myself. As long as you fish for me, I will
continuously depend and wait on you to feed me; and that
is what we are asking today. We are asking today to be
able to control our own destinies. We are not asking for
any more than anyone would ask for, to be able to make our
mistakes, suffer our fates, deal with our consequences but
at least be able to say, "we did it!'"
- Bertha Gilkey
July, 1984
Tenant management has its roots in the movement to
empower poor people in the 1960s. Its early history provides
an interesting departure point when considering tenant
management as a policy option for the 1980s during an
administration and period where empowerment is no longer an
idea in good currency. The original vision and goals of
tenant management in the early 1970s included the sixties
ideology of empowerment as well as the practical management
needs in cities like St. Louis, Boston and Newark. Although
the political winds currently blow differently than in the 60s
and 70s, within public housing developments the original dream
of tenant management has not been completely forgotten or
abandoned by the tenants who live there.
The political climate of the 1960s gave rise to the
unrest and organizing which paved the way for dramatic change
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in the relationship between those with power and those
without, and between tenant and landlord. Organizations like
the Office for Economic Opportunity (OEO), the National
Welfare Rights Organization (NWRO) and the National Tenants'
Organization (NTO) trained poor people to form protest
organizations to gain greater power and control over issues
affecting their lives. (Cuyahoga MHA, 1984) Through
organizing efforts and more spontaneous urban unrest in poor
black neighborhoods, residents ahd minorities were demanding
solutions which provided power and control.
At the same time public housing had become the home of
the poorest in American society. This had not been the
original goal for public housing, which was legislated in the
Housing Act of 1937 as a public works activity to provide jobs
and housing for middle-class Americans temporarily displaced
by the Depression. In fact, by the early 1960s the quality of
the public housing stock had declined so sharply that
developments were often referred to as "vertical slums."
(Diaz, 1979) At the same time, the population in public
housing had shifted to the poorest and mainly welfare-
dependent, and to a higher percentage of black and minority
residents. For example, from 1963-1970, the non-white
population in Boston public housing increased from 13.5 to
37%, and the percentage of tenant households on public
assistance rose from 56 to 75%. (BHA Task Force, 1973)
The federal response to the changing character of public
housing in the early 1960s mainly focused on increasing
operating and rent subsidies to alleviate ,growing financial
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problems. Meanwhile the growing unrest around welfare reform
and civil rights led to increased activism within public
housing. In 1967 HUD issued a directive dealing explicitly
with tenants' rights. In 1968 the agency developed a program
for the modernization of public housing which provided funds
for physical rehabilitation and called for extensive resident
participation. HUD specifically suggested the creation of
resident modernization committees. At the same time HUD
issued guidelines which encouraged LHAs to contract out
management services to private firms and included guidelines
which called for tenant involvement in management decisions.
(Diaz, 1979)
In the same year, 1968, public housing tenants in St.
Louis launched a crippling rent strike out of which tenant
management was born. The strike left the LHA bankrupt and
rendered it unable to manage the largest family developments
This forced the authority to become more receptive to the
concept of tenants taking a more active role in management.
Authority staff saw the idea of tenant management as a way to
maintain the peace while relieving themselves of a troublesome
management situation. The relationship between LHA and
tenants had deteriorated beyond any conventional resolution.
The activism and negotiating skill of tenants during the
strike suggested to public officials that both the desire and
the potential to manage could emerge from the tenants
themselves, given some support and assistance. (Kolodny, 1983)
When an agreement was finally reached in mid-1969, it
included drastic changes in LHA management responsibilities.
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In addition to a new rent structure, tenants won the
institution of a Tenant Affairs Board (TAB) to take part
directly in the formulation and implementation of LHA policy.
A contract between the LHA and tenants called for shared
management reponsibilities with the Authority responsible for
personnel, budgeting and finances, and rent collection. In
1973-74, the LHA signed formal contracts creating TMCs at
three St. Louis family developments supported by grants from
HUD and the Ford Foundation. (Diaz,1979)
On the Cochran TAB was Bertha Gilkey who emerged as the
earliest and most articulate spokesperson for tenant control
of on-site management. Gilkey continues to head the Cochran
board and travels around the country training public housing
residents in tenant management skills. She recalls that in
St. Louis, "the Authority had just blown up the Pruitt-Igoe
development in 1973 and in 1974 they were going to blow
Cochran up. We had to convince them that we could manage it
and they threw their hands up and said 'go ahead, its all
yours.'" (Gilkey interview, April 1986)
The seeds of tenant management which were planted in the
late 1960s included the selection in 1968 of the Bromley-Heath
development in Boston as recipient of $565,000 in OEO funds to
explore the feasibility of tenant management. The five-year
contract executed in 1971 between the BHA and the Bromley
Heath TMC was the first example in which a TMC gained almost
total independence from an LHA. As in St. Louis, Bromley
tenants provided much of the impetus to take over management.
Bromley was also a situation where the LHA had clearly failed
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in its management tasks; the development was in "deplorable
condition" (Hailey interview, 1985), and tenants felt tenant
management was a means of reversing that situation. In both
St. Louis and in Boston the failures of local housing
authorities combined with the movement toward poor people
taking power over their own lives led to tenant management.
Two other experiments in tenant management warrant
inclusion in its brief history leading up to the national
demonstration project in 1976. A brief attempt at tenant
management in Washington D.C. involved a private realty firm
Shannon and Luchs. In 1968 the LHA turned over management
responsibilities at two family developments to the firm, which
in turn advocated inclusion of tenants in management decision-
making and the hiring of a resident manager. The LHA was
lukewarm to tenant management and the experiment ended at the
end of a two-year demonstration period when tenants voted to
leave management to the private firm rather than taking it
upon themselves. (Cuyahoga MHA, 1984)
Another experiment in Hawaii also lasted less than two
years. A TMC at the Koolau Village development near Honolulu,
was formed under HUD's Management Improvement Program in 1974.
While the TMC's management efforts were, by all accounts,
successful, they ended when the federal funding ended. Tenant
apathy and the departure of two key members are cited as the
main factors in its failure. (Cuyahoga MHA, 1984)
In. each of these cases external financial support was
critical to the development and continuity of the TMCs. The
need for technical assistance and training and the long
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transition period required for transfer of management
responsibilities required money. In each case LHAs didn't
have the resources to fund that expensive transition.
(Kolodny, 1983) Acquiring financial autonomy was critical to
TMCs in asserting some degree of independence from LHAs. The
early years of tenant management were characterized by
hostility and mutual mistrust between LHAs and TMCs. To
survive in those years TMCs had to be autonomous, had to do it
without the support of the local authority, and in most cases
with no assistance from local public officials. Gilkey
asserts that, "most TMCs are set up by the housing authority
to fail. In St. Louis out of six TMCS only two have survived
because the others did not have the ability to go outside and
hustle for money. We've survived because we knew we had to do
it ourselves and we went out and hustled." (Gilkey interview,
April, 1986)
That the St. Louis and Boston TMCs not only survived, but
had success in reversing the decay and hopelessness in what
had been some of worst urban housing conditions at the time,
gave the model greater national currency and spawned the
national demonstration project in 1976, managed by the
Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation (MDRC). The MDRC
selected seven sites in six cities: Rochester, Oklahoma City,
New Haven, Jersey City, Louisville and New Orleans. Sponsored
and funded by HUD and the Ford Foundation, the project was
designed to test the viability and cost-effectiveness of
tenant management. A key component of the project was the
evaluation after three years by the MDRC. Near the end of the
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three-year project, HUD renewed the funding for two years, and
contracts with LHAs were renewed at the four sites where the
TMC survived. (Diaz, 1979)
Oklahoma City dropped out in the early phases and New
Haven signed a contract with its TMC but also dropped tenant
management within two years. Only one of the two Jersey City
tenant management sites stayed with the project. Each of
these aborted TMC efforts have been attributed to internal LHA
problems, conflicts and resignations arnd not to an
unwillingness on the part of tenants. (Kolodny, 1983) In
three of the four surviving TMCs the training and transition
period resulted in signed agreements by the end of the initial
funding in mid-1979. All four -- Ashanti in Rochester, B.W.
Cooper in New Orleans, Iroquois Homes in Louisville, and A.
Harry Moore in Jersey City -- renewed management contracts
with LHAs without the continuation of special funding in 1981.
(Kolodny, 1983)
In Louisville, the Iroquois Homes situation was unique in
that it has been the only example to date of a TMC taking over
a development that was not troubled. The Louisville LHA
director promoted tenant management and in 1976 selected the
Iroquois Homes development because it was the newest, in the
best condition, had a strong resident council, and was the
city's only majority white development. (Downs interview, Dec.
1985) The Rochester, New Orleans and Jersey City experiences
all involved troubled sites, but ones with strong resident
organizations and leadership.
The MDRC evaluation in 1979 fell far short of endorsing
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tenant management as a federally or locally-initiated policy
option. It concluded that tenant management was feasible and
worked fairly well at some sites but that it could not be
expected to succeed at every site, or even at most sites. The
MDRC also concluded that overall tenant management was not a
significant improvement over traditional public housing
authority management, and that it was more costly. (MDRC,
1979) However, the project did launch four TMCs which are
still active today, and whose success, as judged by their
survival and in the evaluation literature (Cuyahoga, Kolodny,
Diaz), lends credence to the notion that tenant management is
a viable management option, not just an isolated phenomenon.
To bring the story of tenant management through the end
of 1985, involves new TMCs at developments in St. Louis,
Newark, Washington, and Jersey City. Newark's Stella Wright
development is an interesting case in that, as in St. Louis,
the impetus came from a rent strike. Part of the strike's
resolution was the signing off of management responsibilities
to tenants in 1978. (Diaz, 1979) Both the St. Louis and
Jersey City experiences are informative as cases in which
there have been more than one tenant-managed development under
the same LHA. The Kenilworth-Parkside development in
Washington was the latest development to embark on tenant
management in 1982, and is unique in its ability to date to
operate more cost-effectively than had been the case
previously. (Wilson, 1984) Residents of Lakeview Terrace in
Cleveland expect to sign a management contract to form a TMC
at that troubled development in 1986 or 1987. The new
24
NCNE/Amoco Foundation demonstration project will likely add
TMCs to developments in Denver, Houston, Minneapolis, Chicago
and Tulsa, as a first step toward eventual tenant
homeownership. (Inge interview, Nov. 1985)
25
V. NATIONAL TMC MODELS; A BASIS FOR CASE ANALYSIS
Tenant management has been attempted at different sites
and under very different circumstances in U.S. public housing.
The experience in three cities will be considered more closely
than the others, Bromley-Heath in Boston, four developments in
Jersey City, and Kenilworth-Parkside in Washington D.C. These
three cities have been selected as good ones to study the
models and experience according to the specific questions
listed below. They were also chosen based on their
convenience for primary data collection.
A comparison of the different TMC models will provide the
basis for drawing conclusions about the viability of tenant
management as a management option in public housing. If
tenant management is judged to be viable the conditions
required for successful implementation of that option with any
likelihood of success will be determined. Finally, those
pre-conditions will form the basis for assessing the potential
for tenant management at five large Boston developments.
The important questions for assessing and comparing cases
can be divided into three categories: historical, internal
management, and external effect. The historical questions
assess the factors leading up to tenant assumption of
management responsibilities. These questions provide the key
to determining what the pre-conditions were which allowed
tenant management to work at the sites studied. The internal
management questions assess the actual TMC performance against
real estate management measures. The external effect category
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considers mostly by-products of tenant management not directly
related to real estate management like job creation,
supportive service programs, and harder to measure factors
like community spirit and pride. These two sets of questions
are most relevant to the overall assessment tenant
management's vialbility as an alternative to central LHA
management.
The historical category for case analysis includes the
following questions:
1) What were the local circumstances which led to tenant
management? In many of the cases, tenant management got its
start in the worst developments, at the initiative of tenants,
and with an external funding source playing a key role, but
there have been exceptions.
2) What kind of relationship has there been with the LHA?
How supportive has the LHA been of the TMC and how has that
relationship developed over time?
3) What condition was the develoment in when tenants
assumed management responsibilities? Was there an upgrading
by the LHA before the contract was signed or agreed to in the
contract?
4) What is the level of grassroots resident participation
at the development? Has turnout been high or low at resident
meetings?
5) What role have key individuals played in the formation
and continued viability of the TMC? The history of tenant
management has in many cases centered around key individuals
in leadership roles with the TMC. How important is it, then,
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to have a skilled, sophisticated, charismatic leader at the
head of a TMC? In most of the cases, the TMC is identified
with one such charismatic leader, like Mildred Hailey at
Bromley-Heath, Bertha Gilkey in St. Louis, or Kimi Gray at
Kenilworth-Parkside. Could those TMCs survive without that
key individual? Can one or more persons be found to assume
that role, and if so, how can they be identified?
The internal management category includes the following
questions:
1) Is tenant management more costly? What changes in the
TMC model would make it less costly? Conventional wisdom says
that tenant management will always be more expensive than
central management because of the training and consulting
costs and the costs of setting up a decentralized operation
that can't take advantage of economies of scale.
2) What level of management efficiency has been achieved
at the tenant managed development? It is critical in
evaluating the effectiveness of TMCs to look at the internal
measurements by which any management model would be judged.
Management effectiveness is often difficult to measure but
data which document the effectiveness of rent collection, work
order turnaround, and occupancy rates will be compared. This
question will be discussed specifically in chapter nine.
The third category for case analysis, external effect,
includes the following questions:
1) What kind of supportive services, job training and
economic development programs have been promoted and
implemented by the TMC? One of the prominent claims made by
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each of the tenant managers interviewed and in the writings of
advocates for tenant management is that the TMC experience
results in improved living conditions beyond mere functions of
management. These external factors include job creation,
improved service delivery, decreased welfare dependency,
improved security, and stronger and more cohesive sense of
community.
2) Is the community safer or less safe under tenant
management? Has the level of crime, drug use, and vandalism
decreased or increased noticeably with tenants managing
themselves?
3) Is tenant ownership of units being considered as the
next stage? This is the case at Kenilworth-Parkside and
Cochran. Tenant leaders claim that the prospect of ownership
provides an incentive for residents to work toward increased
rent collection, reduced costs, and diminished vandalism and
crime at the development. (Gray interview, March 1986; Gilkey
interview, April 1986) Given that homeownership is an
important component of the current national tenant management
demonstration project, its potential impact on tenant
management will be considered.
Finally, when discussing the experience of different
TMCs, it is important to establish an operational definition
of successful tenant management. This thesis will ask three
questions to determine a specific case of tenant management's
success or failure. First, does the TMC survive over a period
of years? This question is even more useful to define failure
in situations where the TMC does not last. Second, how well
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does the TMC perform according to traditional measures of
management efficiency like rent collection, vacancy reduction
and workorder turnaround time? Success would likely include
better performance on these measures as compared to management
at the site before the TMC and against other developments in
the same city. Third, what external benefits have occurred as
by-products of tenant management? Successful tenant
management, according to this thesis, not only needs to
satisfy the first two questions, L'ut must also demonstrate
some level of job creation, service provision and change in
residents' feelings about themselves, their neighbors, and
their living environment.
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VI. BROMLEY HEATH: A BOSTON CASE
"As public housing tenants, we need to be in control of
our own lives, and at Bromley Heath, we all feel more
power because of the TMC. And we do a better job."
-Mildred Hailey
Executive Director, Bromley-Heath
TMC, Nov. 1985
Bromley-Heath is both the oldest existing TMC, and the
one in which tenants have the greatest amount of autonomy from
the LHA. Bromley-Heath is a local example of success as
measured against the three sets of criteria outlined above.
The TMC has survived for 14 years and provided a model of both
internal and external management effectiveness which other
cities have attempted to replicate. It is an interesting case
to examine because of that success and because Bromley's
experience in Boston can inform the question of tenant
management's potential for success at other local sites.
Bromley-Heath combines three developments with a total of
1088 units spread over 25 acres in the Hyde Square
neighborhood of Jamaica Plain in Boston. Of the 1088 units,
645 are occupied by. approximately 2,000 persons, of whom 81%
are black, 18% Hispanic and 1% white, 49% under the age of 18,
and 80% single parent households. The 10 seven-story and six
three-story buildings which make up the development are in a
changing neighborhood with mostly old multi-family private
housing stock. The surrounding neighborhood is of mixed
racial composition, which currently consists of 36% White, 30%
Black and 42% Hispanic residents, though recent trends
indicate that the majority of replacement buyers and renters
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in the neighborhood are Hispanic. (Bromley-Heath Fact Sheet,
1985)
According to the Bromley-Heath TMC's own chronology of
events the first significant event leading to tenant
management was the passing of the Civil Rights Act in 1964
which made money available by establishing OEO. In 1967 Ellis
Ash, the BHA Administrator, submitted a proposal for tenant
management to OEO which was funded the following year.
Columbia Point, a family development in Dorchester, was first
considered for the pilot program, but tenants voted not to
participate. (Bromley-Heath Fact Sheet, 1985)
According to TMC Director of Communication and long-time
resident David Worrell, "Ellis Ash was a liberal administrator
and may have genuinely wanted to help tenants, but his Board
was controlled by (then-Mayor Kevin) White." White was not
considered a friend of public housing tenants. According to
Worrell and other accounts of the TMC's inception Ash was able
to sell the tenant management idea for two reasons: he had
raised the money from outside sources, and the developments
under consideration, Columbia Point and Bromley-Heath, were
afflicted with some of the worst problems in the city. Both
were communities with high crime and vandalism, many vacant
and substandard units and with a predominantly black
population. (Worrell interview, Nov. 1985) According to TMC
Executive Director Mildred Hailey, "Ash was the only one in
the city who cared about us at the time. The mayor, the city,
and the BHA department heads and staff had the attitude of
let's do anything aslong as we can wash our hands of these
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problem sites." (Hailey interview, Nov. 1985)
In 1972 the TMC received a direct grant from OEO and
BHA/TMC negotiations led to a signed contract which took
effect January 1, 1973. The TMC took over complete management
responsibility for the three developments with Mildred Hailey
as Housing Manager and Anna Cole as Chairperson. (Bromley-
Heath TMC, 1984) As the TMC enters its 14th year with both
Hailey and Cole in the same leadership positions it is
important to consider the significance of the roles played by
those individuals in the development and maintenance of the
Bromley TMC.
In the case of Bromley-Heath, Mildred Hailey's role has
been particularly pivotal. According to TMC Director of
Operations Steve Vadnais, "There would be no TMC without
Mildred." (Vadnais interview, Nov. 1985) Since the early days
of the TMC Hailey has taken a public and visible role at its
head. Interviews with some of the ten TMC Board members
confirms the impression that the Executive Director has,
through a combination of charisma, charm, presence and
political and personal skills, been critical to the TMC's
development and continued operation. The importance of one
skilled and charismatic individual as a central force in
making tenant management work is by no means unique to
Bromley-Heath, as evidenced by Bertha Gilkey's role in St.
Louis and the presence of at least one such leader in the
developments where tenant management has survived.
Could tenant management have survived at Bromley-Heath
without Mildred Hailey? This important question is difficult
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to answer. Opinion among those tenants involved in the TMC in
its early stages almost unanimously support the notion that
without Hailey there would be no TMC. (TMC interviews, Nov.
1985) Hailey insists, "My role has always been as that of a
facilitator; I have been able to transfer leadership skills to
others. We had to develop, though. We took this over in a
bad climate where the BHA didn't care about Bromley-Heath."
(Hailey interview, Nov. 1985)
A brief analysis of the debate around this question leads
to the conclusion that the TMC could not have survived its
early years without Hailey or another leader with her skills
and energy. The importance of Hailey or of any single leader
diminishes over time to the point where the TMC's survival
today does not depend on any one leader. This question is
considered further in the cases discussed below.
What have been the other ingredients for the success and
survival of the TMC? It has only been very recently,
according to Hailey, that the TMC has received any amount of
support from the BHA, so clearly it has survived on its own
and due to circumstances existing within the development.
According to Hailey:
"The key ingredient which we had was that tenants have to
want it, really want it and be willing to work hard and
take responsibility. Also we were fortunate in that we
already had a strong core of leaders, a good atmosphere
with strong family ties, and a tight community which holds
it all together." (Hailey interview, Nov. 1985)
The level of cohesiveness among Bromley tenants she describes
most likely applies mainly to the top tenant leadership active
in the early 1970s.
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There is clear evidence that the existence of a visible,
skilled set of leaders, in a cohesive community, in which,
according to Hailey, "we were selfless, and there was noone
involved for personal gain, and we didn't fight among each
other," was critical to the TMC's success. Bromley TMC
leaders consider the tightness of the community as critical to
the development of an effective leadership cadre even before
tenant management at the site. Clearly if any group of
reside Its had resisted the leadership of those who took over
management responsibilities they would likely have failed.
"We could never have done it without the fact that people
living here really wanted it to work," says Hailey. (TMC
interviews, Nov. 1985)
That cohesiveness has been described by other observers
as almost an insularity and cliquishness which may have
allowed for successful, albeit autocratic management, but
which has also left those leaders open to criticism that the
organization is top-heavy and undemocratic. Hailey's response
to that criticism is to state that, "We have never denied that
it was a clique, but that clique has always made room for one
more." She adds, "People say I play favorites, but when we
took over people had no hope in this project, and as long as
people can take pride in the community I don't mind the
criticism." (Hailey interview, April, 1986)
In terms of survival the Bromley-Heath TMC has clearly
been a success. How successful has it been by the internal
management criteria? The results are sketchy, due in part to
the fact that the TMC keeps its own records on rent
35
collection, maintenance, and compiles other management data
which the BHA compiles and publishes for all other
developments. The TMC is guarded with its data and the
numbers are difficult to compare with those of the BHA both
because they may have been compiled to give the most favorable
impression of TMC efficiency and because the categories and
data-collection are not always equivalent. Both BHA Area
Director Dorothy Griffith and Vadnais at the TMC maintain that
data would not indicate dramatic improvements over BHA
management and that the TMC should be judged according to
other criteria. Griffith, who acts as BHA liaison to the
Bromley Heath TMC, claims that it costs the BHA about 1-5%
more to manage at Bromley-Heath than a BHA-managed family
development of the same size. (Dorothy Griffith interview,
Oct. 1985)
The slight increase in expenditures at Bromley-Heath is
counter-balanced by the level of external benefits in evidence
at the site. TMC leaders point to these benefits first when
asked to define the level of their success at Bromley-Heath.
"We took the wholistic approach from the very beginning," says
Hailey, adding, "We brought in job referral and training, a
daycare center, the health center and then negotiated for the
TMC. We measure our accomplishments in the changes in people
more than in management and bricks and mortar." (Hailey
interview, April 1986)
How does Bromley-Heath perform according to the external
effect criteria like job-creation\through economic development
and level of supportive services available at the development?
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The management corporation alone provides jobs for more than
30 tenants; others have been provided at service agencies
which have been established on-site. (Bromley-Heath fact
sheet, 1985) Those agencies, which deliver necessary
services, include a community center, a health center, a day
care and infant day care center, and Hispanic center.
According to Hailey, "I measure our success in managing
according to the quality of life we have been able to create.
We now have more people working, more going to school and a
strong community spirit because we have done it ourselves."
(Hailey interview, April, 1986)
The TMC is also implementing a modernization effort which
will repair some of the physical and structural damage of
buildings and bring currently-vacant units on line. This work
has been long overdue according to TMC staff and leaders, who
claim they should not have signed the original agreement with
the BHA without the money or commitment to bring the housing
up to code standards. According to Hailey, when residents
signed the management contract there were "more then 4,000
broken windows, tons and tons of garbage, and a boiler plant
that didn't work." (Hailey interview, April 1986) "We were
stupid," says Worrell, adding, "We thought we knew what we
needed better than the BHA but even with that knowledge we
took it on without knowing what we could and couldn't do. We
should have made sure the BHA brought the units up to code;
instead we had to try to do it without the additional money."
(David Worrell interview, Nov. 1985)
The group of TMC leaders all strongly supported the
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notion that aside from the mistake of postponing
modernization, the 14-year experience with tenant management
has been overwhelmingly positive. Several independent studies
have reached the same conclusion. (NCNE, Diaz, Cuyahoga,
Kolodny) TMC leaders at Bromley-Heath have succeeded
according to all three criteria for success outlined in this
thesis and according to the "wholistic" criteria specified by
the resident manager.
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VII.JERSEY CITY: FOUR CASES OF TENANT MANAGEMENT
"We saw how residents turned things around at A. Harry
Moore, but most people here were still skeptical. We had
lots of problems, but figured we might as well give it a
shot. We managed to pull together and make it work. If we
didn't have the TMC, the Housing Authority would have big
problems. Managers don't care about residents; they can
leave at 4:00. We understand the problems because we live
here too."
-Catherine Todd
Board Chairperson
Montgomery Gardens TMC, Dec. 1985
In Jersey City, like St. Louis, and unlike Boston, more
than one attempt has been made to institute tenant management
at a local public housing development. Two developments, A.
Harry Moore and Curries Woods, were part of the 1976 MDRC
Demonstration project. The TMC at A. Harry Moore provides a
model ten years later of successful tenant management while
Curries Woods failed in its efforts to get tenant management
off the ground, due mostly to tenant disinterest. A third,
Montgomery Woods, signed a management contract in 1979
following on the visible success at Moore. A fourth, at
Booker T. Washington, signed a management contract with the
Jersey City Housing Authority (JCHA) in late 1985 and is now
getting off the ground.
One key difference in Jersey City from both the St. Louis
and Boston tenant management experience, was that from the
outset the JCHA and its Director, Robert Rigby, encouraged and
lent support to tenants' efforts to exercise more control in
the management of their developments. The ten year experience
has been described by tenant leaders as mostly one of mutual
trust, cooperation, and a management partnership between
tenants and LHA staff. The impetus toward tenant management
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came from a new progressive LHA administration need to take
some action to deal with its most troubled developments along
with increased internal capacity and interest of resident
leaders in those developments. Also the support of the Jersey
City mayor played a role in giving that initial momentum
toward funding and implementation. (Rigby, 1981)
As was the case in St. Louis the intense degree of
deterioration and hopelessness in Jersey City public housing
demanded some intervention. In Jersey City's case tenant
management became the final policy choice due mostly to the
timing of the MDRC Demonstration Project. The decision to try
tenant management followed intermediate agreements between the
LHA and residents on strategies to adress that deterioration
at specific sites.
With the LHA/tenant relationships constant among the four
cases Jersey City is interesting given that two developments
developed a strong cooperative management model and another
failed to get off the ground. The Jersey City case has been
documented in excellent studies conducted by Rigby and by
Columbia University researcher Robert Kolodny. The following
discussion draws from those studies and from interviews with
tenant leaders and with Rigby during a visit to the four
Jersey City developments.
The situation which the JCHA faced in 1973 when a new set
of administrators led by Rigby took over was one which the new
director describes as one of "rancid site conditions, a
bankrupt authority, and hopelessness." (Rigby interview, Dec.
1985) In a 1985 paper on tenant management as an approach to
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salvaging troubled public housing, Rigby writes:
"The task confronting the JCHA's newly installed
administrators seemed quite clear. Site conditions must
be changed for the better or the developments will further
deteriorate and ultimately be abandoned. Traditional
expenditure and design approaches were not feasible
options. More important, it seemed clear that even if
typical renewal options were available, they would have
been insufficient."
(Rigby, 1985)
According to the report, Rigby chose two strategies in
1973 which eventually led to tenant management: 1) the
turnabout would involve informal social and behavioral changes
at the project level which would not require money and which
could not be destroyed by vandals, and 2) this approach could-
not be implemented throughout the authority so that any
progress would have to be made development by development and
even building by building. In 1974 the JCHA decided to focus
its mostly non-monetary resources toward turning around the A.
Harry Moore development which was "in by far the worst
condition and facing possible demolition," according to Rigby.
(Rigby interview, Dec. 1985)
A. Harry Moore (AHM) is a family development of seven 12-
story brick buildings on 10 acres with 662 units of 1-4
bedrooms. Tenants were predominantly very poor (all JCHA
tenant households have incomes below 80% of the area median),
Black, single-parent, female headed households with an average
of three children, most of whom had welfare as their primary
source of income. (Rigby, 1985) Rigby describes the
situation at AHM before action was taken as follows:
"By 1973 site conditions were rancid. Ten of the site's
14 urine-stenched elevators were inoperable and had been
for almost half a year. Deteriorated utility systems
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resulted in chronically erratic services. Public spaces,
such as hallways, stairwells and building lobbies lay
vandalised and debris ridden, an engulfing state of
squalor. Approximately 20% of project apartments had been
permanently abandoned, with vacancies increasing at a rate
of almost 15/month. Crime and vandalism were the
behavioral norm; fear and hopelessness, the pervasive
ethos."
(Rigby, 1975)
The turnaround effort began with a series of meetings
between AHM tenants and JCHA staff. The JCHA, in those
negotiations, agreed to refurbish one of the seven buildings
and in exchange tenants in the building would organize to
monitor the area to maintain the improvements. The JCHA, in
an effort to sustain and broaden its rehabilitation and
resident organizing efforts, looked for external money and was
able to procure funding from the New Jersey Department of
Community Affairs (DCA) Housing Demonstration Program. The
DCA awarded the JCHA $121,000 in May, 1974 as one of six
housing management demonstrations statewide to try new
approaches to public housing management in low-income high
density projects. The JCHA applied the relatively modest
grant amount to extend its efforts already underway at AHM and
Curries Woods. (Rigby, 1982)
An important element of the DCA grant in the evolution of
tenant management in Jersey City, according to Rigby, was that
it provided for continued funding for a tenant organizer at
AHM. The organizer worked in each building to develop a
system for residents to protect the refurbishing efforts from
vandalism and their buildings from drug use and crime. The
effort developed lobby monitors, building captains, tenant
leaders, and most importantly an organization of tenants
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committed to making the development a better place to live.
(Rigby, 1982) The level of organization was critical to both
considering tenant management in 1976 and to its success at
AHM and Montgomery Gardens. Kolodny, in his study on AHM,
writes,
"To begin with, they (lobby monitors) provide a task
around which people can organize and reorganize when
activity begins to wane, and they are a symbol to the
outside world that the residents care about their
buildings. But beyond this, the elements of the building
organizations -- floor and building captains - create a
basic structure which can be embellished. With the
assistance of an organizer or through an evolutionary
process, tenants can begin to expand their focus to
include other activities.
(Kolodny, 1976)
By 1976, according to the Rigby study, conditions had
already changed at AHM. Leadership had emerged, a resident
organization was taking more and more day to day
responsibility at the development and security and vandalism
problems had decreased. All that remained was for tenants to
take a greater role in actual management of the site. (Rigby,
1982) Tenant dissatisfaction with LHA management combined
with JCHA awareness of the success in the St. Louis experience
had Rigby thinking of ways to increase the resident role in
management. The problem of how to implement that greater role
was solved in early 1976 when HUD announced the MDRC national
demonstration project, and Jersey City signed on for AHM and
for Curries Woods.
Clearly the initiatives taken by the JCHA and by
residents at AHM were critical to the eventual decision to
implement tenant management at the site. The transition was
possible because those JCHA approaches directly involved
43
residents. The linkage between refurbishment efforts and
tenant organizing allowed leadership to develop and emerge
among AHM residents. This emergence of leadership was another
important component of the transition toward the recognition
of an increased internal capacity at the site. Finally the
transitional period of 1973-76 led to the establishment by
necessity of a working relationship between the LHA and
residents which involved rights and responsibilities on the
part of both.
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Table 1: Comparison of Site Characteristics at 3 Jersey City
Tenant Management Sites in 1976
Characteristic A.H. Moore Mont. Gardens Curries Wds.
No. of buildings 7 6 7
No. of apartments 662 462 712
Year occupied 1954 1953 1959
Apt. density/acre 85 81 67
Vacancy rate 19% 1% 1%
Households:
White 14% 15% 57%
Black 73% 65% 41%
Hispanic 13% 20% 2%
Single Prnt. 68% 47% 25%
Elderly 11% 25% 41%
Avg. Pers per apt. 3.9 3.8 3.0
Source: Rigby, 1982
The process by which CW became the second tenant
management demonstration site follows almost exactly that at
AHM. The outcomes were however much different; the CW Board
resigned 16 months after assuming management responsibility
before a contract was even signed with the JCHA. CW, with
seven 13-story buildings on 10.6 acres, and 712 units, was
JCHA's largest development. Physically AHM and CW were almost
exactly the same and in similar condition at the time of the
start of the demonstration. Two key demographic differences
between the developments were that CW had a much higher
percentage of white households (57-14%) and a higher
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percentage of households headed by an elderly person (41-11%)
(Rigby, 1982) (see table 1)
Like AHM the turnaround effort at CW started with
refurbishing and organizing efforts in two buildings. Those
initial organizing efforts generated results according to
Board Chairperson Catherine Smith. Tenant patrols, lobby
monitors and elevator operators were working throughout the
site until the DCA money ran out. (Smith interview, April
1986) Smith maintains that at the point in 1976 before the
money ran out, leadership at CW was strong and stable, but
that when that grant ended and the JCHA proposed management,
"all hell broke loose." The former Board chairperson recalls
that:
"They (JCHA) had no choice but to offer us tenant
management because our tenant council (UCC) was strong.
When it was first proposed we thought it was a good idea
-- people were saying, 'we can do a better job.' Then all
these big people, consultant types came in and did away
with the UCC. We wanted to keep what we had.
At the same time, Curries Woods was still in transition.
There was a rapid turnover of the population. Another
factor was our relationship with the Housing Authority. We
were very suspicious of them, when we needed to be
partners. There sure was no partnership there. The entire
Board eventually resigned. The new Board failed, but it
was not just because it was a bad Board. Things were
happening here which the Board had no control over, like
whites moving out and blacks moving in."
(Smith interview, April 1986)
In May, 1974, one month after the DCA-funded organizing
program accelerated, the residents in the two buildings at CW
went on a "quasi rent strike" to win commitments from the
Authority and salaries for the lobby monitors. According to
Smith, "tenants became disenchanted working hard on patrols
where they were not getting paid." (Smith interview, April
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1986) The "strike" ended before legal action was initiated by
the JCHA but an acrimonious and adversarial relationship was
established between residents and the Authority. (Rigby,
1982)
Rigby gives a slightly different account of the failure
at CW. In his 1982 report, Rigby writes that the JCHA efforts
through the DCA grant were generating far less in enthusiasm
and results than those at AHM. Rigby recalls that the level
of parti cipation in resident capacity-building and organizing
activity at CW was low and that progress had been made by 1976
mostly in the area of social services. The JCHA Director
recalls that, "the Authority's support of, or rather
concession to, the (CW) Tenant Council's targeting an at-
large, social service effort had failed to create even a
semblance of the organizational building blocks generated by
AHM's lobby-monitors." (Rigby, 1982) Even though the JCHA
Director felt that CW lacked the leadership or organizational
capacity of AHM, and though tenant interest in taking on
management was far less than at AHM, the JCHA's application
was submitted and approved to make CW the seventh site in the
MDRC national demonstration.
At the time, the JCHA's rationale for the application was
two-fold: 1) conventional management at CW had proven
completely ineffective and unsatisfactory to residents, and 2)
that given responsibility to manage residents would by
necessity form a strong organization as well as a cooperative
partnership with the JCHA. (Rigby interview, Dec. 1985) The
failure of tenantmanagement at CW is attributed by Rigby and
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Kolodny to the lack of interest and participation of
devlopment residents. The hostile relationship with the LHA
is also cited by JCHA and residents as a key difference
between the CW and AHM experience which had an impact on the
very different outcomes.
Leadership turnover at the CW Board was another major
destabilizing factor, with more than 70 residents serving on
the Board during the demonstration period. Finally, there was
more commitment among leadership as well as among residents to
make tenant management work at AHM than at CW, and that may be
the single most critical difference between the two.
According to Smith: "A. Harry Moore is across town but it
might as well be on the other side of the world. It is a
whole different set of people over there. They were
consistent; we never got our act together." (Smith interview,
April 1986)
The initiative which resulted in tenant management at
both AHM and CW came mostly from the JCHA, and its new and
progressive executive director. AHM resident leaders
expressed dissatisfaction with central management and then
embraced the idea of tenant management, but the idea really
came from Rigby, whose awareness of it came out of the St.
Louis experience. Reverend Robert Blount, who was Board
chairman when the TMC got started and has been Resident
Manager since 1981, remembers that, "We knew we could do a
better job of managing than the Authority, but we could never
have gotten started without them giving us a push, getting us
into the training program, and then providing support."
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(Blount interview, Dec. 1985)
The two other Jersey City sites in which residents have
taken on tenant management built directly on the successful
experience of AHM. At Montgomery Gardens (MG), the Authority's
third high-rise family development, resident leaders had been
understandably advocating with the JCHA since 1974 for the
same kind of organizing and refurbishing campaign that had
been turning things around across town at AHM. In building
design the 462-unit site, with six 10-story buildings, is
almost an exact duplicate of AHM. The populations of the two
sites also mirror each other except for MG's slightly larger
number of households headed by an elderly person. (Rigby,
1982) (see Table 1)
The conditions before tenant management at MG were
similar to those at the other two high-rise sites in 1974 with
a few exceptions. While, according to Rigby, "the interior
and exterior public spaces were devastated," MG had a less
than one percent vacancy rate, the rate of serious crime was
lower, and "except for the acutely deteriorated physical
appearance and condition of the site, other indices of
residential distress were relatively low." (Rigby,1982)
MG residents were enthusiastic, organized, and ready to
make a commitment for the refurbishment effort, according to
both Rigby and residents. The JCHA, on the other hand, was
involved in conflict at CW in late 1974 and early 1975, and
was reluctant to interpret this enthusiasm at MG as
organizational potential. (Rigby, 1982) In this case the
residents took the greater share of initiative. MG residents
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presented the JCHA a plan for building-by-building organizing,
lobby-monitoring and refurbishing, which the Authority agreed
to proceed with.
Although MG was not included in the MDRC demonstration
resident leaders expressed interest in tenant management and
confidence that they would make it work. In late 1977 the
JCHA and the MG tenant organization agreed to initiate tenant
management independent of the national demonstration. A TMC
Board was elected in February and a staff was hired in May of
that year. TMC staff training was completed in February, 1979
and the contract signed on October 31 of that year was almost
identical to that signed by AHM residents more than a year
earlier. (Rigby, 1982)
At MG the Board hired the tenant organizer, Lillian
Howard, to be the Site Manager. Also a resident, and former
building captain, Howard remains the site manager in 1986.
She recalls:
"I knew how the Housing Authority worked and how to get
things done from my experience as community organizer. We
knew we could manage more effectively. My staff is working
all the time; we're not gone at 5:00. We got the halls
repainted, floodlights put in, security in lobbies, and
new entrances. We did it with the Authority's best wishes,
but it was my role, and those of other leaders that made
it work."
(Howard interview, Dec. 1985)
With Howard and Board Chairperson Catherine Todd still in
key leadership roles, MG provides another model of effective
tenant management. While the experience at MG has not been the
subject of the volume of research that AHM has inspired, Rigby
and the tenant leaders interviewed have verified that the TMC
has succeeded against the three criteria outlined above. MG
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differs from AHM in the degree of initiative taken by
residents in the earliest stages and in the less advanced
state of deterioration that existed at the site. MG residents
as well as JCHA staff also had the opportunity to learn from
both the success of AHM and failure of CW.
The 314-unit Booker T. Washington (BTW) development will
formally become the fourth Jersey City site to undertake
tenant management when a contract is signed with the JCHA
sometime in 1986. It will be the first low-rise TMC
development and though it is much smaller than the three high-
rises tenant leaders hope to follow the same cooperative
management model as those which they have observed at AHM and
MG. According to the tenants' association President Frances
Charles, who is training to become the site manager:
"We have had many problems with management, and they
still exist today. We were able to get $2 million for site
renovations, and fortunately we have a strong tenant
council so we can always tell the Housing Authority what
we want. And once we have a signed contract, they will
have to listen. We still need to build confidence among
tenants here that tenant management will work."
(Charles interview, Dec. 1985)
It will be interesting to. follow the BTW management experience
given some of the differences in size and density. If
Charles' assessment of the organizational strength and
capacity of the tenant association is correct there will
likely be.a third TMC success story in Jersey City.
What then were the pre-conditions for success or failure
at the three Jersey City TMC sites? The conditions which set
up the failure of tenant management at CW are clearly linked
to the historical questions. The commitment of residents and
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turnover of leadership on the Board and relationship with the
JCHA were key factors.
The role of individual leaders in the respective TMCs
again warrants some discussion. Rev. Blount clearly commands
the respect of the residents of AHM. After spending two hours
with Rev. Blount in and around the site, that respect was
evident, as was the fact that he is a tireless and committed
worker. Howard and Todd at MG have also been active, well-
respected, hard-working leaders for years, and have played
significant roles in the success of that TMC. A key
ingredient in both beyond mere personal skills is the depth of
organizational and Board experience of the leaders. According
to Rigby, that experience and the low turnover of leaders at
AHM and MG, compared to high leadership turnover at CW were
critical factors in making two survive and one fail. (Rigby
interview, Dec. 1985)
Both TMC sites have measured high on traditional
management performance indicators on both a before and after
basis as well as in comparison to other Jersey City sites.
Both AHM and MG have held vacancy rates at or below 2%. AHM's
vacancy reduction has been particularly dramatic; vacancies
are down from 20% in 1974 and 8% in 1976. Both sites have
reduced the number of apartment repair workorders remaining
unfilled at the end of the month from the 150-300 range to the
20-40 range. Both have reduced the number of households
delinquent in rent payment for more than 30 days from a 20%
level to a 3-9% range. (Rigby, 1985)
The turnaround at the two sites is equally dramatic on
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external, social indicators. Major crimes against people and
property have remained at or bclow city-wide averages and well
below other low income neighborhoods without public housing.
At AHM this represents a reduction in serious crime from three
times the city-wide average in 1974. The internal capacity
for employment, economic development and independent
fundraising have also increased at both sites. Some of the
programs instituted by the TMCs include: senior citizen
dinners, community trips, summer recreation and food programs,
job training, and neighborhood enterprise development.
(Rigby, 1984)
Finally, both AHM and MG hold monthly well-attended
tenant meetings to exchange information, air complaints, and
review problems. These meetings, which do not take place at
other Jersey City developments, are important to sustain
communication and foster participation and tenant ownership of
internal management responsiblity. The most intangible and
hard to measure indicator is the sense of power, community and
confidence within the tenant population at the two
developments, one of which (AHM) faced possible demolition
eleven years ago. That collective sense of pride and self-
worth which was absent before tenant management at both sites
is cited by Rigby and tenant managers as one of the primary
arguments for its duplication at BTW and elsewhere. (Jersey
City interviews, Dec. 1985)
With three developments managed by residents Jersey City
has replaced St. Louis as Exhibit A to make the case for
tenant management. It has worked at two large and troubled
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sites and failed at another. The result of that failure at CW
is as telling as the success at AHM and MG in documenting the
effects of residents managing. According to former CW
chairperson and current resident Catherine Smith, "I'm very
sorry tenant management didn't work here. Had it worked I'nm
sure we would be much better off than we are back with the
Authority. Today we are in very bad shape." (Smith
interview, April 1986)
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XIII. THE CASE OF KENILWORTH-PARKSIDE
"People talk about public housing residents as though
we're somehow different from everybody else. The only
difference is we're poor, poor, poor. But we're no
different. Doesn't everybody want to control their own
destiny? Doesn't everybody have dreams? Well, here at
Kenilworth we're about making our dreams come true."
- Kimi Gray
Board Chairperson,
Kenilworth-Parkside, Washington
(Cohn, 1985)
Kenilworth-Parkside, a 464-unit family, low-rise
development in the northeast corner of Wahington D.C., is the
most recent case of a tenant managed development. It
contrasts with both the Bromley-Heath and Jersey City cases in
a number of interesting ways. Besides being a low-rise
devevelopment and smaller than those in Boston and Jersey
City, its TMC has emerged in a much different political
climate. Like both, it is another typical before and after
success story of a troubled development turned around by the
efforts of a TMC. Unlike the three previously-discussed cases
residents at Kenilworth-Parkside (KP) are actively discussing
tenant ownership of units there. For that reason the
development has become the jewel of the Reagan
administration's eye and is frequently cited by HUD officials
and conservative spokespeople as a prototype of local control
which should be replicated elsewhere.
The KP TMC, like those in St. Louis, Boston and Jersey
City, grew from widespread discontent among residents over
shoddy housing conditions at the site. According to Resident
Architect Michael Price, "We were tired of having no heat or
55
hot water for three years. We got organized and met with the
(Housing Authority) Director, the Mayor, and asked them to let
us give managing a shot, since things couldn't get worse."
(Price interview, Dec. 1985) Tenant leaders were able to
propose tenant management on the heels of the successful and
by then, stable TMC operations in Boston, St. Louis and at
some of the other demonstration sites. Housing authority
officials reluctantly agreed that they had nothing to lose and
sponsored a two-year training program in 1980. A formal
management contract was signed in March, 1982 and a Resident
Management Corporation was established.
The story behind the establishment of tenant management
in KP seems to duplicate those in the previously discussed
cases. The initiative to. manage did come from resident
leaders within the development. In this case the LHA agreed
to provide training without access to earmarked funding from
an external source like HUD or the Ford Foundation. The
political climate in the early 1980s was also clearly
different from that in the 60s and 70s. Programs like VISTA,
OEO, and Model Cities, which sought to address poverty and
powerlessness through organizing and empowerment were in the
early 1980s falling victim to the so-called "Reagan
revolution."
HUD, during the Reagan administration, has made public
housing one of its budget-cutting targets. Officials in the
department speak in nothing but glowing terms, though, about
the tenant management effort at KP, and in 1984 rewarded the
development with a $13.2 million grant for renovations. In
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his 1984 State of the Union address, President Reagan singled
out Kenilworth-Parkside as a model for the future in solving
problems in public housing. One of the sponsors of a
homeownership demonstration project based on that model is
conservative Representative Jack Kemp. The model included an
opportunity for residents of KP to purchase their units and
the development has signed on to HUD's national demonstration
project to encourage homeownership of public housing units.
(Gray interview, March 1986)
Timing and location have combined to put the KP TMC in a
brighter national spotlight than its predecessors. By the
three criteria of this thesis and as assessed by liberals as
well as conservatives, the TMC at KP has been an enormous
success. It is an interesting case because it is the most
recent and because it has attracted so much national attention
from all sides of the ideological spectrum. That attention is
a result of KP's success, the ability of its charismatic and
articulate Board Chairperson Kimi Gray to promote that
success, and of the fit between KP residents' desire to
control their housing and HUD's interest in unloading public
housing units.
Support from HUD helped KP leaders build the TMC effort
in the early stages when the District of Columbia Housing
Authority (DCHA) was providing only limited support. The DCHA
did have enough interest in tenant management to enter into
the original agreement, but according to TMC leaders, it has
only been recently with the hiring of a new Director,
Madeleine Petty, that the relationship has been positive.
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(Roy interview, Jan. 1986) The 1982 management contract gave
the TMC all responsibility for rent collection, building
maintenance, tenant selection, accounting, and policy
decision-making. "The only time we need to deal with them
(the DCHA) is for money," says Roy. Several unsuccessful
attempts were made to discuss the KP situation with DCHA staff
who either expressed ignorance or an unwillingness to comment.
The results on internal management indicators have been
dramatic, particularly in fiscal management and rent
collection. (see Table 2) It is rare in urban public housing
for rental receipts to cover development operating costs but
under tenant management KP has reached internal self-
sufficiency. The per unit monthly rental receipts at KP
increased by 60% in the first year after the TMC took over,
and increased another 28% in the second year. (Marshall,
1984)
The TMC was at the same time successful in lowering
operating expenditures while increasing the level of on-site
services. Table 2 breaks down rental income and operating
expenditures for the final year of LHA management and the
first two years of tenant management at KP. The figures are
per unit per month and were not available for 1982.
Administrative costs at KP declined more than 60% in the first
year of tenant management.
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TABLE 2 - Income and Expenditures before and after tenant
Management at Kenilworth-Parkside
Conventionally
Managed Tenant Managed
9/81 9/83 9/84
Operating Receipts
Rental Income $ 60.14 101.00 130.52
(+60%) (+28)
Operating Expenditures
Pdministration 17.48 6.34 6.94
Utilities 6.19 7.77 8.40
Ordinary Maintenance 74.31 54.73 59.69
(-26) (+9)
Non-routine Maintenance 0 2.26 ----
Source: Marshall, 1983
Ordinary maintenance, including day-to-day upkeep
expenditures declined by 26% when tenants took control. Both
the administrative and maintenance costs increased by less
than 10% from the already lowered levels. Utility costs
increased 26% in the TMC's first year, and stabilized in the
second year. The initial year increase can be attributed to
inflation and a higher occupancy rate. (Marshall, 1984) This
experience with utility costs contrasts with the general
experience in urban public housing where utility costs make up
a significant percentage of operating costs, and are often
overwhelming.
The fiscal success of the TMC is due primarily to three
factors: the significant decrease in the vacancy rate, greatly
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improved rent collection efficiency, and the increased income
of development residents, resulting from more job creation.
The factors all relate directly to tenant management and what
TMC leaders claim is both the increased effectiveness of
residents collecting rent from other residents and the greater
willingness of those residents to pay on time for greatly
improved living conditions. (Roy interview, Jan. 1986)
On the expense side the TMC manager claims that the
incentive for fiscal responsibility is greater for residents
managing their own development than for a housing authority.
(Roy interview, Jan. 1986) The money that is saved one year
can be pumped back into the local budget instead of becoming
part of a city-wide operating deficit. The change is due
partly then to the decentralization of accounting and partly
to education and training of residents who learn that things
like lower demand for routine maintenance and energy
conservation benefit them individually as well as the project
as a whole. (Gray interview, March, 1986) This attitude of
collective responsibility and self-interest is a definite by-
product of tenant management, and is not frequently the
prevailing attitude at large urban public housing
developments.
It is the external by-products of tenant management at
Kenilworth-Parkside that have gained the most national
attention and which tenant leaders choose to highlight as the
TMC's major accomplishments. Programs that have been
initiated and run by the TMC involve education, economic
development, day care, education, and others which add
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significantly to the sense of pride and attachment to
community experienced by KP residents. These programs,
according to resident leaders, are as important as the
management-oriented changes in changing the physical and
psychological state of the development. Kimi Gray expresses
the greatest satisfaction in these external management
achievements:
"The Housing Authority deals in bricks and mortar only.
We say if you don't serve residents, they don't serve
you. Supportive service programs are as important as the
day-to-day operations here." (Gray interview, March 1986)
According to Gray the most important supportive service
program at KP actually started in 1974 -- the "College Here We
Come Program." The program, which Gray refers to as "the
mother of all other programs," provides GED, remedial and
college-level tutoring for residents along with assistance
with applications, financial aid forms, and access to local
universities. Gray claims that between the start of the
program and fall of 1985, 487 students have been sent to
college or university from the development. (NCNE, 1985)
The TMC in 1982 contracted with.the DC Department of
Employment Services for a job training program. The program
provides training from building maintenance staff in plumbing,
electrical work, painting, plastering, and minor repairs to
youth in the development. Other economic development programs
initiated since tenant management include a resident-managed
thrift store, a clothing store, an on-site snack bar, and a
beauty parlor. These enterprises are ones which not only
create jobs for residents, but also fill important community
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needs. The supermarket, for example, is the only place within
a two-mile radius of the development where fresh produce and
meats can be purchased. (Roy interview, Jan. 1986)
Supportive service programs initiated by the TMC include
two day care centers for pre-school children, a health care
center, family counseling, legal services, and a mini-
employment agency. The day care centers, which were the first
initiative of the TMC after the contract was signed in 1982,
serve 25 children each, -and are an excellent example of how
supportive services, economic development and job creation,
and management efforts are interdependent and feed on each
other. Providing on-site day care provides employment
directly to eleven staff at the centers, and indirectly by
allowing a parent using the day care services the ability to
work instead of staying home with the child. The enhanced
earning potential and subsequent income of these residents in
turn enhances the TMC's rent collection efforts.
The final extension of KP residents' vision of change at
the development is a cooperative homeownership program which
will allow residents to actually own their units. The
ownership issue in public housing raises many interesting
auestions which will not be considered in this thesis. The
important questions in the KP case are: 1) How has the
possibility of ownership affected the level of management
success?, and 2) Whose vision was it that has been implemented
at the development and who have been the critical actors in
determining its course?
Homeownership of units, as promoted by HUD in its
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national demonstration project, has been enthusiastically
embraced by KP residents. "Homeownership is our ultimate
goal," says Gray, who claims, "Residents understand that we're
going in that direction and it provides motivation to go out
and get employment and keep the rents paid up." Gray
envisions a cooperative at most of the site, but insists, "we
will never have 100% ownership, since we want to leave rental
units available for those who can't afford to own." (Gray
interview, March 1986)
The prospect of owning one's apartment may be a useful
carrot or incentive to public housing residents, and one which
makes a development easier to manage by residents. The
evidence is less than complete in the KP case and the results
of the ownership experiment will prove interesting both to
inform policy analysts on that program and to shed light on
the efficacy of tenant management as a transition to
homeownership. The early success of the TMC at Kenilworth
suggests that the skills of the resident managers, initiation
of programs, and changed atmosphere within the community have
been more important to the tenant management effort than has
been the prospect of ownership.
It is interesting that the vison and goals of resident
leaders at KP and those of Reagan administration housing
officials seem to have converged. The idea of tenant
ownership came from HUD, not from residents at the
development. Without the national demonstration it is unlikely
that KP residents or any public housing residents would be
able to initiate any type of ownership program. It is
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important to consider here because the model of tenant
management being encouraged by HUD in 1986 is one which will
lead directly to eventual ownership of units by residents in
Denver, Houston, Chicago, Kansas City, Tulsa and Minneapolis,
as part of the current national demonstration project.
A final question which emerges again from this case, as
it did in the previous ones is that of the importance of the
key individual in making tenant management work. According to
Mabel Roy, "there would be no resident management without Kimi
Gray." (Roy interview, Jan. 1986) The role of Gray as the
articulate and charismatic Board chairperson is still
significant at KP and was clearly pivotal in the original
formation of the TMC. Gray has now become a national
spokesperson for tenant management and even for tenant
ownership. Other KP leaders have expressed doubt that the
development would have considered any type of ownership were
it not for her enthusiastic support and advocacy for the
program. (Roy interview, Feb. 1986)
Gray argues that for tenants to take over management,
"you do need charismatic leaders, but it is never just one
individual." She adds, like Hailey, that, "we train
leadership here, we get all the information around and never
hoard it or sit on it." (Gray interview, March 1986) Again,
it seems that the role of one or more charismatic, highly
skilled and respected leaders is critical to the initial
phases of negotiating tenant management. This individual role
is more significant the less support the tenants receive from
the LHA and the ,importance of that individual declines over
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time with the increased capacity of the TMC and the local
resident community.
At Kenilworth-Parkside, the tenant management effort in
only four years, has achieved a level of stability and success
beyond the expectations of anyone involved. KP's success
provides evidence that tenant management is not merely a
policy solution for large developments. KP's experience also
confirms that a TMC can emerge and survive in the political
climate of the 1980s and without the support of a national
demonstration project involving multiple sites.
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IX. HAS TENANT MANAGEMENT BEEN AN EFFECTIVE MODEL?
The experience in Boston, Jersey City and Washington,
provides some strong evidence that tenant management is a
viable management model for residents of public housing. This
chapter will consider the set of conventional management
questions in greater detail to explore further the issue of
the viability of tenant managment. It is this set of
questions dealing directly with real estate management which
is considered most critical to its acceptance as a management
model by LHAs, housing analysts, and public officials.
Critics of tenant management frequently cite its high
costs and its failure to improve on LHA management
performance. Eugene Meehan, in his discussion of the St.
Louis tenant management experiment, argues that the TMCs have
failed to manage better than the LHA. Meehan cites the
negligible improvement in vacancy reduction, in rent
collection, and maintenance delivery compared to LHA-managed
developments as evidence that TMCs do not offer a model for
more-effective management. (Meehan, 1979)
The amount of hard evidence and data on TMC management
performance in the respective cities is limited. In each
situation the method of data collection, LHA management and
accounting, and circumstances are different, so it is
difficult to make comparisons or draw conclusions from those
data. This chapter will consider each measure of management
efficiency by considering the data which are available as well
as ways in which the TMC model has or can address those
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discrete management functions.
1)Budgeting and Fiscal Management -- Two questions are
critical to consideration of this management function: Is
tenant management more costly and in what ways does the TMC
model provide more fiscally efficient management than
traditional LHA management? Tenant management has generally
been more costly than central management for three reasons: 1)
the lengthy transition period and training and technical
assistance costs, 2) modernization, refurbishing and upgrading
costs that often are necessary at developments making the
transition to tenant management, and 3) the increased cost of
additional site personnel usually required by TMCs. This
thesis will argue that TMCs can be at least as efficient as
LHAs in fiscal management and that as long as costs are the
same or even marginally higher, that tenant management should
be judged according to the other internal and external
criteria.
The most complete data that have been collected on the
cost of tenant management were compiled by the MDRC from the
seven demonstration sites. The study concludes that tenant
management is more costly. That conclusion, though, considers
only those seven sites, three of which failed to get a TMC off
the ground, and considers them only in the start-up years when
the costs are highest. (MDRC, 1979) It is likely the numbers
would be different if the study had considered more stable
later years when start-up costs are not factored in. Also,
the MDRC merely documents the increase in expenditures without
considering the cost-effectiveness of those increases. This
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thesis argues that in each case the initial increase in
expenditures is justified considering the local return and
that over time the TMC can move more easily toward financial
self-sufficiency.
The MDRC determined the incremental cost of tenant
management at each site by determining the pro-rated cost
under LHA management, adding a HUD inflation multiplier for
each of the three years, and subtracting the total from the
actual amount spent on tenant management at the site for the
three demonstration years. By this accounting method A. Harry
Moore in Jersey City is projected for three years at
$4,156,000, which is $651,000 less than the amount actually
spent. The incremental TMC cost by this methodology at AHM,
is 16%. (MDRC, 1981)
At Curries Woods, the second Jersey City demonstration
site, the increased cost was 18%. At both Jersey City sites,
technical assistance costs were relatively low since the LHA
participated directly in the training process. More than half
the increase in cost at the sites went for personnel on site
and in the central office. (MDRC, 1981) Again, these data
reflect the costs of the three years of the demonstration,
July 1, 1976-June 30, 1979. Those years do not correspond
with actual takeover of management by the TMC with a signed
contract in every case.
The highest incremental cost of the seven sites was
recorded at Ashanti in Rochester. The nearly 30% increase in
costs is attributed at Ashanti to personnel costs,
particularly an increase in security staff, shifting early
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from the special demonstration budget to LHA payroll. The
other incremental cost increases, according to the MDRC
methodology, were 22.6% in New Haven, and 13.5 percent in New
Orleans. The MDRC could not report cost data from Louisville
since that LHA did not break down costs for its individual
projects, or from Oklahoma City, where tenant management was
dropped in early 1978. (MDRC, 1981)
Of the seven demonstration sites, the one with the most
up-to-date fiscal data is A. Harry Moore in Jersey City. For
that development the evidence indicates that cost increases
decreased for each year after the initial demonstration phase
and that revenues increased to defray those costs. At
Bromley-Heath, the concrete financial data is unavailable, but
BHA Area Manager Dorothy Griffith estimates that the TMC there
spends slightly more than the BHA spends at a development of
comparable size. (Griffith interview, Oct. 1985) The
continued increased cost of the Bromley TMC can be partly
explained by the amount of external programs and services
available at that site compared to others in Boston. The
Kenilworth-Parkside development in Washington D.C. provides
recent evidence to support the proposition that tenant
management can be a cost-effective management model in which
the TMC can both reduce costs and increase revenues. (see
Chapter 8)
A critical component of a TMC's takeover of budgeting and
fiscal management is the decentralization of those
responsibilities. The institution of project-based financial
management providesan incentive to save. Under LHA central
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management that local incentive to save does not generally
exist since costs are aggregated and any savings at one site
will likely be a cost overrun at another. Decentralized
tenant management or decentralized LHA management would allow
local managers to roll savings into the next year's budget or
into other programs or expenses. An additional argument for
greater resident involvement in budget issues is that those
who live at a site can much more efficiently set spending
priorities for a development.
The additional cost of tenant management is much less of
an issue in cases where external money is available to cover
the costs of training and technical assistance. In the
demonstration cases, as well as at Bromley and Kenilworth,
federal and private monies were raised to meet the
transitional expenses. It must also be noted that in most of
these cases LHAs were dealing with their most seriously
deteriorated, troubled developments, so that they could have
expected higher costs to improve conditions regardless of
management type. If the additional cost corresponds to
additional supportive service and job creation at the site,
this thesis would argue that the cost-effectiveness at those
sites should be measured in both the increased revenues
generated and the quality of those programs.
2)Rent Collection -- The other side of cost is revenue,
and the success collecting rent is critical to a development's
fiscal and psychological well-being. Rental revenue losses
cause reductions in routine maintenance and LHA failure to
efficiently collect rent can signal residents that the
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Authority will tolerate other activities outside normally
accepted activity, like vandalism and crime. (Fuller
interview, Feb. 1986) There are two ways performance of this
management function can be improved: regular collection of
delinquent and current rents and increasing the amount of
collectible rent. There is evidence to indicate that TMCs can
perform more effectively than LHAs in both areas.
The MDRC report concluded that there was no noticeable
effect in the thr e years at the demonstration sites on rent
collection. The report cites an increase of average monthly
rent, and rent collected at three sites, A. Harry Moore, New
Haven and New Orleans. (MDRC, 1981) Of the four sites where
the MDRC study failed to find an increase in rental revenue,
two failed to survive. The other two, Louisville and
Rochester, realized greatly improved rental revenue in the
years following the MDRC study period.
The data available on rent collection are by no means
comprehensive but do indicate strong performance by TMCs. At
A. Harry Moore from 1978-82, the average per-unit rent
collected increased from $74 to $108, a 47% increase, compared
with a 40% increase at other Jersey City sites. Delinquency
had been reduced in 1982 from 15-25% to under 5%, which was
lower than for other JCHA developments. (Rigby, 1985) At
Iroquois Homes in Louisville, 96% of rent due was collected by
the TMC, compared to less than 95% by other city sites. At
the New Orleans B.W. Cooper development, rental income was
increased more than 100%, from $67,000 a month in 1978 to
$178,000 a month in 1984. (Hundley, 1985) At Kenilworth-
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Parkside, the increase in rental revenues is even more
dramatic. The per-unit monthly rent more than doubled from
$60 to $130.50 from Sept. 1981 to Sept. 1984.
There are a number of reasons why TMCs should be able to
raise a higher percentage of rental income due than LHAs. One
reason, cited by TMC staff, is that as residents themselves
they establish better relationships with other residents. The
TMC/resident relationship contrasts with the often adversarial
LHA/resident relationship in wnich residents are more likely
to test the limits of the rent collection system. Another is
that improved morale and improved living conditions that have
been by-products of tenant management at troubled sites
provide more of an incentive to pay rent to residents of those
sites. Tenant management has also provided access to
employment opportunities through job training, childcare, and
economic development programs which have led to decreased
unemployment and welfare dependence, higher incomes, and as a
result higher rent rolls.
3)Tenant Selection/Eviction -- Much has been written
about the so-called "problem tenant" in public housing
communities. Vandalism, drug trafficing, and crime have been
as critical to the breakdown of those communities as
deteriorating bricks and mortar. In Boston, developments like
Mission Hill, Orchard Park, and Charlestown, where vandalism
and crime are most widespread are considered the most troubled
by BHA staff. (Fuller interview, Feb. 1986) While the roots
of these problems are most likely found in poverty,
joblessness and poor housing conditions,,the short-term
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management response is to improve tenant selection and make it
easier to evict those tenants causing the problems.
Both tenant selection and eviction are management tools
which can be critical to the livability of a community. Poor
tenant selection has been cited as the cause of deterioration
at BHA developments, like West Broadway in the late 1960s and
70s. BHA area managers list the inability of the Authority to
evict "problem tenants" as one of the most significant
management problems at BHA-managed developments. (Area
Director interviews, Oct. 1985)
It is easier to document the case that TMCs can more
effectively perform eviction than it is to make the case for
TMC tenant selection. For one, most LHAs have maintained
responsibility for tenant selection, either because they have
been unwilling to share or give up that responsibility or
because tenants have not wanted to do it. None of the
demonstration TMCs participated in tenant selection and even
the Bromley-Heath TMC has left that one task to the BHA. The
one exception has been Kenilworth-Parkside, which has assumed
all management responsibilities including tenant selection.
Tenant selection is a function which raises a number of
sensitive issues. In some cases, there are strict legal
requirements for how to maintain waiting lists and fill
vacancies. In others, tenant selection opens the opportunity
for favoritism and abuse of power by whoever controls the
process. Another issue is one of selecting higher income
working tenants over more needy lower income persons. This
income-mixing strategy might prove particularly tempting to
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managers in a newly-renovated development. The experience at
other rehabilitated developments does suggest that residents
are more likely to admit only the highest-income applicants
with the best records. (Area Directors interview, Oct. 1985)
The record shows that in TMC developments the moveout
rate is much lower so that tenant selection becomes mostly an
issue for reoccupying vacant units. While this is far from
the most critical management function, I would argue that it
is one that would be enhanced with a greater degree of direct
tenant participation. This is particularly true in tenant-
managed developments where the residents who best understand
community needs are also taking responsibility for maintaining
the quality of life in that community. It is equally
important that the TMC not be able to exercise complete
discretion and that a strict set of written selection
guidelines be negotiated with the LHA and adhered to by the
TMC.
TMCs attempting to evict a family must go through the
same legal process as an LHA. That process can be very
difficult and time consuming. TMC staff can be more effective
than LHA staff in identifying "problem tenants" because they
have much closer contact with the community and due to the
increased level of tenant organization and communication in
tenant-managed developments. (Hailey interview, March 1986)
Also residents in that community are more likely to monitor
activities in their buildings and neighborhoods than in LHA-
managed developments, which will result in speedier eviction
of residents involved in crime, drugs or vandalism. (Friend
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interview, Oct. 1985)
4)Maintenance delivery -- This management function has
the greatest impact on how residents feel about their living
environment in public housing. Issues of filling emergency
and routine workorders are mentioned most frequently by
residents at BHA developments who are asked to discuss
management problems at their developments. (Mission Hill,
Charlestown, Orchard Park, West Broadway, Franklin Field
interviews, March 1986) One of the greatest challenges for
the landlord is to keep up with maintenance demands heightened
by vandalism and the demands of old stock, heating, electrical
and plumbing systems.
How then, can resident managers improve on the often poor
performance of LHAs in maintenance delivery? There is limited
evidence that TMCs have performed better than LHAs in cities
with tenant-managed sites but it is inconclusive. At A. Harry
Moore there are data to support that notion: in the last four
months of 1981 the TMC completed 9.41 workorders per day
compared to 8 by the closest competitor in Jersey City during
the same period. In 1982 the AHM TMC also performed far
better than any other family site in the number of incomplete
workorders outstanding with 0 for six straight months. (Rigby,
1984) At the Louisville TMC site, 96% of routine workorders
were completed in five days or less compared with 93% for
large family developments as a group. (Kolodny, 1983)
The amount of hard data on maintenance delivery at the
other TMC sites is sketchy at best. The MDRC evaluation
concludes that the demonstration sites performed worse than
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before the TMC on maintenance but the same problems with the
study apply as mentioned above. One must also consider that
the transition to tenant manager often involved a complete
restructuring of maintenance staffs and hiring of residents
who required training.
Another key factor in TMC maintenance delivery is that,
as in any situation where management functions are contracted
out, the TMC maintenance staff is not tied to union guidelines
and job titles. For most LHAs and definitely for the BHA,
union job titles and wage restrictions can define both the
level and type of staffing at local developments. The
constraints imposed by the maintenance staff unions at the BHA
has led to inefficient maintenance delivery, according to BHA
area managers. (Area manager interviews, Oct. 1985) For
TMCs or any private manager, the absence of unionized staff
can mean more staff per level of resources, and a distribution
of skills and experience geared more directly to the
particular needs of the specific site.
The effectiveness of maintenance delivery and lower
worker turnaround time are tied to more than just the
efficiency of the staff. According to Bromley-Heath
Operations Director Steve Vadnais, "Here the staff is
constantly in touch with the most urgent maintenance needs,
because they are residents, and live with the same problems."
(Vadnais interview, Nov. 1985) The other side of the
proposition that management staff can better relate to tenant
needs seems to be true also. Residents relate to and
empathize better with TMC staff, as evidenced by the fact that
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tenant complaints and demand for services is lower at Bromley
than at other BHA developments and much lower at AHM than at
other Jersey City developments. (Rigby, 1984)
5)Occupancy/Vacancy Reduction -- This is as much a
function of overall Housing Authority policy as it is a
management issue. It deserves brief mention here since a
site's success in reducing vacancies and in occupying units
has been mentioned prominently in much of the TMC literature
an, because the occupancy level is tied directly to project
income. Also the vacancy problem is one to which LHAs
throughout the country are seeking policy interventions to
alleviate. In Boston, BHA Administrator Doris Bunte has made
the reduction of vacant units in family public housing as one
of the main priorities of her administration. (Hall
interview, Dec. 1985)
The MDRC evaluation gives the TMC sites high grades on
both vacancy reduction and on turnaround time to occupy units.
It is difficult in this case, however, to make the connection
between TMC management performance and reduction of vacant
units. The latter often depends on a commitment of
modernization money by the LHA or an external funding source.
Also, in cases like Bromley-Heath in which the TMC was unable
to substantially reduce vacancies, it is often due not to TMC
failures, but to an inability to raise external funding.
(Worrell interview, Nov. 1985)
The success in reducing vacancies at A. Harry Moore
illustrates another factor which argues for the increased
effectiveness of TMCs in this category. According to AHM
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Resident Manager Rev. Blount, "We pulled the whole community
together to make our project a better place to live. No
matter how much money the Authority gave us before (tenant
management) it didn't matter because the property would be
destroyed and noone wanted to live there." (Blount interview,
Dec. 1985) Increasing development occupancy, which in turn
increases the rental revenue, is tied to factors related to
the collective feeling of pride in community and improved
desirab lity of units in that development. Those factors are
difficult to quantify and document, but as discussed in the
case studies, they are ones which often follow tenant
management.
6)Conclusions -- When breaking down management
effectiveness into its component parts, one can argue that
tenant management can be more effective in each individual
category. Each discrete function, however, is dependent on
every other variable and outcome. Vacancy reduction increases
rent collection which can add to maintenance staff and reduce
turnaround time. Just as important as success on the above
management functions to TMC performance are the external
functions like job training and development, security, and
service provision.
The TMC track record on many of the external variables
has been documented in the case studies. The achievements in
Boston, Jersey City and Washington at increasing tenant
employment, improving security and delivering supportive
services give ample support to the notion that TMCs can
succeed against those criteria. Again, these performance
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criteria are dependant on others, and are most dependent on
the commitment of residents to make a comprehensive assault on
conditions at the development. This is not to say that
similar results could not be achieved by LHA management. In
the three cases studied however, the TMC sites succeeded in
areas where LHA management had failed at those sites and in
other comparable sites in the same city.
One additional criterion must be factored into the
equation. That critrion, which is cited by Kolodny and in
the MDRC study, is the extent of tenant satisfaction with
tenant management. The MDRC survey of tenants at
demonstration sites found general satisfaction with the TMC
performance. Kolodny's study of the demonstration sites and
Jersey City, Rigby's of Jersey City, Struyk's of St. Louis, in
addition to the Cuyahoga Housing Authority and NCNE reports
all mention resident satisfaction and pride as important
outcomes of tenant management.
The level of satisfaction, pride, sense of increased
power and hope among residents in large urban public housing
developments is difficult to accurately measure. This thesis
will nonetheless assert that the attitude transformation is as
important a by-product of tenant management as any of the
measurable management performance outcomes. This assertion
derives partly from the social and organizational principle of
self-help which says personal and organizational development
is tied to people working together to improve their own lives
as opposed to being dependent on others, and partly from the
case evidence.
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The comparative evidence of sites which succeed and sites
which fail (like A. Harry Moore and Curries Woods)
demonstrates that it is communities which unite, avoid
divisiveness and show individual and collective initiative and
hard work which can manage themselves. Likewise, first-hand
observation of tenant-managed communities in Boston, Jersey
City and Washington leaves one with the strong impression that
residents of those communities feel great pride in having
succeeded in self-management in a more livable environment.
It is an interesting chicken and egg question of which comes
first, the pride and initiative, or the tenant management
effort. The answer, I would argue is that both are true:
there needs to be some organizational capacity before tenant
management can work and tenant management will develop
organizational skills, pride, and self-worth among residents.
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X. PRE-CONDITIONS FOR TENANT MANAGEMENT
Tenant management is a viable management option for
public housing. The model should not be applied at every
public housing development in every city, however. Even the
most ardent advocates of tenant management from Mildred Hailey
to Robert Rigby argue that it can't work everywhere. The
failures at Curries Woods, New Haven, Oklahoma City and
Hawaii, along with tenant disinterest at Columbia Point
confirm this viewpoint.
The critical question becomes then, where should tenant
management be implemented? This thesis will identify the most
important pre-conditions or circumstances which one should
look for when considering a site for that option. This list
of pre-conditions for tenant management will then be used to
determine the potential for tenant management at five Boston
developments.
The pre-conditions for tenant management are:
1) Tenants at a local development have to want to take
over management responsibilities. Not every tenant needs to
enthusiastically embrace the idea. There does need to be a
commitment from at least a core of active leaders willing to
take on greater responsibility. In cases where tenant
management has worked, like Bromley-Heath, A.Harry Moore and
Kenilworth-Parkside, leaders have cited the strong desire that
existed from the outset. Conversely, in the cases where
tenant management has failed to get off the ground like
Hawaii, Curries Woods and Columbia Point, it has generally
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been attributed to tenant apathy.
This is probably the single most important pre-condition
for tenant management. There are ways to overcome almost any
other obstacle. In fact, there have been cases to support
exceptions to almost all the other pre-conditions listed
below. The idea that residents of all public housing
developments want to manage or be managed by other residents
has been proven to not be the case. Even in cities like
Jersey City and Washington where there are developments with
proven management track records, residents in other sites have
preferred to leave the responsibility to the LHA. Tenant
management requires hard work and responsibility which not all
public housing residents are willing to assume. Where that
unwillingness exists, tenant management can never be an
option.
2) For residents at a development to have an interest in
tenant management there needs to be a high level of
dissatisfaction with LHA management at the site. This is
closely related to the first pre-condition. If residents are
happy with conditions and with management and maintenance
delivery it is highly unlikely that they will be motivated to
take an additional burden on themselves. In most of the cases
this dissatisfaction has been readily apparent and loudly
articulated at sites in extremely poor physical condition.
3) There needs to be a certain level of organizational
and managerial potential among tenants at the development
considering tenant management. In most of the cases studied a
well-organized and active resident organization played a
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significant role in the negotiations to take over management
reponsibilities. In the St. Louis, Jersey City and Washington
cases, the level of organization was used as an explicit
argument for transition to management. Signs of
organizational strength and capacity include attendance at
meetings, participation in elections, success of projects
planned and implemented, and low turnover of leadership. The
Curries Woods failure, for example, has been linked to a high
turnover of leaderbhip and resident apathy as evidenced in low
meeting turnout. In other cases, like Bromley-Heath and
Kenilworth-Parkside evidence of strong local organizational
capacity can be found in the level of supportive service
programs initiated and managed by the resident organization.
4) There needs to be at least one leader capable of
taking the lead role in the TMC. In every successful case
there was one or more highly skilled leaders as well as an
active tenant organization to take the lead in the TMC.
Mildred Hailey, Kimi Gray, Bertha Gilkey, Rev. Blount and
other tenant leaders have been absolutely instrumental in
initiating and maintaining tenant management at their
respective sites. In the case of Hailey and Gray a strong
argument can be made that without them tenant management would
not have gotten off the ground at Bromley or Kenilworth. In
looking at potential sites it is important to identify one or
more persons among existing strong leaders with the desire and
potential to be managers. I would suggest that residents with
the desire to manage can be trained the requisite skills even
if they lack a proven leadership track record.
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5) There needs to be some interest on the part of the LHA
in turning over management to tenants. There does not,
however, need to be a mutually supportive relationship between
the LHA and residents for tenant management to work. For the
two to even reach the negotiating table to discuss a contract
however, there does need to be interest and a willingness on
the part of the LHA to give up some of its control.
The willingness to give up management of some sites is
the first thing to look for from LHAs. Many LHA
administrations have not been willing to consider the option.
The second aspect which would be important is whether the LHA
is actually committed to the idea of tenant management so that
its staff will work with and provide support to resident
managers. TMCs in Boston and St. Louis have done well without
that support but the circumstances in both cases were unique.
Any set of residents which tries to manage without a
supportive and cooperative LHA relationship could survive but
would have two strikes against it before it got up to the
plate.
6) Because there is a transition period of at least 1-2
years before tenants are able to assume all management
responsibilities there needs to be money available for
technical assistance. In most cases funding is not available
from fiscally constrained LHAs so an outside source is
critical.
7) The fabric of the community at the local public
housing development can provide a good indicator of the
viability of tenant management at that site. It is hard to
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define what that fabric consists of and even harder to measure
it. The term "fabric" as it is used in this thesis refers to
the dynamics within the community which cause residents to be
closely knit and work together or to fight among themselves.
Factors like cohesiveness, relative lack of personal divisions
and conflicts, low turnover and lengthy average tenancy
periods of families, have all been mentioned as factors which
have helped make tenant management work. It is certainly
difficult to imagine any group of people experiencing problems
living with one another being able to take responsibility for
managing themselves within that community. It is my guess
that this factor will prove critical in eliminating
developments from consideration where there has been
divisiveness, in-fighting and conflict among tenant leadership
or even residents at-large.
8) The development needs to either be in decent physical
condition with most units ready for occupancy, or plans need
to have been approved and funded in advance of tenants signing
a management contract. The evidence is by no means conclusive
on this factor. In fact some BHA staff have argued that
tenants would have a much higher success rate in planning and
implementing modernization strategies than the authority has
experienced. (Area Directors interviews, Oct. 1985)
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XI. TENANT MANAGEMENT IN BOSTON: RECOMMENDATIONS AT FIVE SITES
In an effort to shift gears from the theoretical to the
practical application of tenant management as a potential
policy option for local public housing developments, the above
pre-conditions will be assessed at five specific sites. The
five Boston family developments: Charlestown, Mission Hill,
Orchard Park, West Broadway, and Franklin Field, were self-
selected and by no means represent the only BHA developments
where tenant management could succeed. They have been
selected because they represent a cross-section of Boston
developments in terms of neighborhood, racial/ethnic
composition and stage of modernization plans. The five
include four of the largest BHA developments, and all have
experienced management problems, and have active and well-
organized tenant task forces.
Each development fits at least one of the local pre-
conditions for tenant management. The fifth pre-condition,
LHA willingness to turn over management responsibility will be
assumed for each development. That willingness has been
expressed by high-level BHA staff even though it has yet to be
put to any real test. This analysis will also assume that
funding for tenant management will be available. Each of the
five study developments has been suggested by BHA staff as a
potential site for tenant management. The presence of one
tenant-managed site at Bromley-Heath would likely increase the
chances for success at a second site since support and
technical assistance would be close and readily available.
The conclusions for each site are based mostly on,
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interviews with BHA staff and local task force leaders. At
each development the chairpersons of the tenant organization
was interviewed. Whenever possible local organizers and
management staff were also were interviewed. For the purposes
of this thesis and to facillitate open discussion of sometimes
sensitive local management issues, persons quoted will not be
cited by name. Table 1 provides some comparative information
about the five developments:
TABLE 3 - Characteristics of Five BHA Developments
Units Occupied Yr. Occ. Racial Comp.
1) Charlestown 1149 900 1940 94.3% White
3.9% Asian
2) Mission Hill 1023 477 1949 37.4% Black
60.3% Hispanic
1.8% White
3) Orchard Park 774 644 1942 81.2% Black
17.3% Hispanic
4) West Broadway 676 531 1949 98.2% White
1.6% Asian
5) Franklin Field 346 281 1954 81.3% Black
16.4% Hispanic
1.8% White
----------------------------------------------------
Source: BHA, 1986
1) Charlestown -- The Bunker Hill development in
Charlestown, with 900 occupied units, is the second largest
development in Boston. It occupies a large section of a
small, white rapidly-changing low-income white community. The
private housing surrounding the development is attracting
higher-income professionals into rapidly appreciating
property. Before thisrecent gentrifying trend, the
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neighborhood had been populated by poor, white, Irish
families. The population of the Charlestown development
continues to match the former characteristics of the
surrounding neighborhood in spite of a recent small inlux of
Asians and Blacks.
According to BHA and task force staff at Charlestown,
residents have always identified strongly with the entire
local neighborhood which included private housing residents.
Development residents participated in force when the
neighborhood organized against urban renewal in the 60s and
against bussing in the early 70s. The changes in the
surrounding private housing are significant in that they have
facillitated the need for residents to organize and focus on
issues at the site, and because they have instilled new fears
in residents. According to one top task force leader:
"The changes around us are very sad. Beacon Hill is
popping up all over Charlestown. We've all lost lifetime
neighbors and friends; they get offered so much money they
have to leave. It makes us wonder, how much will be left
in Charestown? When is it going to be our houses that get
sold off?
"We are not going to become another Columbia Point. There
is no avenue we won't take to protect our homes and make
this a better place to live. We have a strong Board and we
work together."
(Charlestown interviews, April, 1986)
The insularity and feeling of being threatened by the
outside both defines part of the fabric of the Charlestown
community and has been a factor in the development of a
committed and active tenant organization. The make-up of the
community seems to at least minimally satisfy the seventh pre-
condition. Task force members interviewed claim the community
is tight and consists of mostly ,long-term residents. Evidence
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on this point is somewhat sketchy however, given the limited
number of interviews and the claim of one BHA on-site
staffperson that there exist two factions on the task force.
(Charlestown interviews, Nov. 1985)
The strength and depth of the task force seems sufficient
to satisfy the third pre-condition. The task force has been
well-funded and currently employs two full-time organizers.
Meetings have been held regularly and are well-attended. The
top leadership demonstrates the experience and following to
suggest managerial potential. Three leaders have been active
in their respective roles for more than four years. The task
force meets monthly with the local manager and those leaders
interviewed displayed understanding of local management
issues. (Charlestown interviews, April 1986)
Resident leaders and BHA management staff agree that a
number of management and maintenance problems exist which
demand looking at different management models. Those problems
include some which are common to large public housing
developments. According to a HUD management study, any number
of units over 275 is too many for to efficiently manage.
(Jones, 1979) Problems unique to Charlestown include security
and crime at one side of the development, vandalism of vacant
buildings, and maintenance delivery. (Charlestown interviews,
April 1986)
On the surface Charlestown seems like an ideal prospect
to become Boston's second TMC-managed development. It should
not be considered further because it fails to meet the first
and most important pre-condition. Charlestown residents don't
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want to manage. At least the top leaders are dead-set against
the possibility. This lack of interest is due mostly to
overall satisfaction with the current management, as opposed
to other sites where the second pre-condition is met.
According to one resident leader, "We like (the current
manager). We work with them and are very happy with the way
things work now. We meet with (the manager) every week and
touch base on nearly every important issue." Another added
that while the task force currently was pleased to participate
in some things with management staff, "we refuse to take part
in eviction proceedings." Another leader added, "things have
really improved around here; maintenance has improved to about
99% efficiency." (Charlestown interviews, April 1986)
The main obstacle to tenant management at Charlestown is
the current level of satisfaction with local management. An
important component of that satisfaction is the level of
participation of residents in some management operations.
Another aspect of resident reluctance to change the way things
have always been done there is the fear alluded to earlier.
This fear of change and of "becoming another Columbia Point"
seemed beneath the surface of most of the discussion with
Charlestown residents.
2)Mission Hill -- This development is located in a
Roxbury neighborhood in which much of the residential private
housing was razed in the 60s to make way for several hospitals
and medical facilities. With more than half the units
currently vacant and with some of the worst crime and drug
problems ,in Boston it is considered the BHA's most troubled
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development. For several months in late 1985 and 1986 the BHA
administrator set up an office at the development and made
Mission Hill the BHA's number one priority in terms of staff
and financial resource allocation. Funding has been approved
to bring all vacant units on line. When that work is
completed Mission Hill will be the third largest family
development in Boston with more than 1000 occupied units.
The extent of the problems at Mission Hill makes it a
much different situation than at Charlestown. Residents are
intensely dissatisfied with LHA management and maintenance
delivery and there is at least some indication of a desire
among task force leaders to take on those responsibilities.
"Put me down as someone who will manage this place," said one
task force leader, adding, "tenants could definitely do a
better job managing than (current management staff). You've
got to just put your foot down and do it." (Mission Hill
interviews, Feb. 1986)
The list of resident complaints about management and
maintenance at Mission Hill is long and includes problems with
security, crime, maintenance, eviction of "problem tenants",
and complaints about specific staff. (Mission Hill interviews,
Feb. 1986) The level of dissatisfaction is strong enough to
easily satisfy the second pre-condition. That dissatisfaction
is also expressed by BHA central and on-site staff. In May,
1986, the BHA was seriously considering major management
reforms at the site, related both to the size and unique
characteristics of Mission Hill. (BHA interviews, April 1986)
One of those characteristics of Mission Hill is the mixed
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racial composition of the development which is approximately
two-thirds Hispanic, and one-third Black. There is a long
history of conflict and divisiveness within both the Task
Force and the overall development. It is that history which
makes the potential for tenant management at the site
extremely problematic when considering the community and the
organizational potential.
The racial divisions are more serious at Mission Hill
than at any other Boston development. According to a BHA
central management staffperson every staffing and policy
decision at the development is made taking this sensitive
issue into consideration. (Area Director interviews, Oct.
1985) The task force by-laws state that there must be two co-
chairpersons, that one must be Black and the other Hispanic,
and list specific percentage quotas for the rest of the
organization. All meetings are conducted in both Spanish and
English. According to one leader, "There has always been lots
of resentment and lots of jealousy here. Certain people are
always fighting each other. We can't agree on anything;
there's too much divisiveness." (Mission Hill interviews,
April 1986)
Clearly, Mission Hill fails to meet the seventh pre-
condition for tenant management. The community is intensely
divided unlike those in which tenant management has succeeded.
This division would make it extremely difficult for a TMC to
manage even given the presence of some experienced leaders
with a desire to manage. The level of conflict within the
task force makes it difficult to judge favorably its
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organizational potential. Tenant management would almost
certainly worsen the already serious divisions within the
Mission Hill community.
3)Orchard Park -- Five years ago this was one of the
BHA's most troubled developments. (Area Directors interviews,
Oct. 1985) Recently, however, there have been signs of change
at the development. In 1984 a new task force was elected and
residents attended meetings and became actively involved for
the first time in several years. Security and crime problems
which have plagued the development have diminished and a new
sense of hope and optimism is apparent among task force
leaders. (Orchard Park interviews, March 1986)
Orchard Park is also one of the BHA's five largest family
developments. It has almost exactly the same number of
occupied units as Bromley-Heath. It is located in the Dudley
Square neighborhood of Roxbury which has been a low-income
mostly Black neighborhood. The neighborhood is currently the
focus of the city redevelopment agency's plans to invest in
new office and commercial development and may soon be in
transition. The potential for neighborhood changes and the
BHA promise for modernization funding at the site also
contribute to the new sense of optimism among Orchard Park
residents. According to one task force leader, "We still have
our problems here, but things are turning around. Orchard Park
just isn't as troubled as its reputation." (Orchard Park
interviews, Jan. 1986)
The development seemed to be a likely prospect for tenant
management due to a new and energetic set of task force
93
leaders and a cohesive relatively conflict-free community at a
site with a history of management problems. Orchard Park
fails to meet at least three of the pre-conditions however.
One strength of the task force is also its greatest weakness
in thinking of it as a potential TMC. Its youthful energy is
partly due to inexperience. All but one member of the task
force were elected for the first time in 1984. At sites where
tenant management succeeded TMC leaders were long-term
community leaders. According to one task force officer: "I
don't feel we're near ready to take on (management)
responsibility. We're just getting organized as a tenant
group." (Orchard Park interviews, April 1986)
Also, even though there has been a long history of
dissatisfaction with management at Orchard Park, those
attitudes have changed in the last two years. According to
one leader, "We now have one of the best managers we've had in
a long time. Things are getting pretty stable, and we're even
starting to see some progress on the drug problem." (Orchard
Park interviews, April 1986) Resident leaders at Orchard Park
do not want tenant management, partly due to satisfaction with
current management and partly due to lack of confidence in
their own ability to manage.
4)West Broadway -- This South Boston development is
another of the BHA's five largest family developments. Its
population, like that in the surrounding neighborhood of
multi-family private housing, is poor, white and mostly Irish.
The South Boston neighborhood and the West Broadway
development have benefitted politically from the attention of
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the Senate President and since 1983 the Mayor. Those
political connections have been used skillfully by West
Broadway resident leaders to gain funding for local
organizing, supportive service programs and modernization at
the site.
At first glance West Broadway seems like an ideal
candidate for tenant management. The community is relatively
stable and free of the divisiveness of Mission Hill. The
development has one of the lowest turnover rates in Boston.
According to one task force leader, "Most people here have
lived here a long time. Some e.ven go back 30 years to when
they built the place. We hardly see any new tenants and we
don't have problem tenants so there is no need for cause
evictions." (West Broadway interviews, April, 1986)
The well-funded tenant organization has paid strong
dividends by allowing a deep, strong and powerful tenant
organization to develop. The task force includes some of the
most visible, experienced and skilled leaders in Boston public
housing. The co-chair of the task force is also president of
the city-wide organization of Boston public housing tenants.
Two West Broadway residents have been leaders on the Task
force for more than 14 years. In interviews with BHA staff
and with leaders at other Boston developments when, the
subject of tenant management was raised a common response was,
"check out West Broadway," based on the reputation of local
leadership.
Those same leaders, when asked about taking more
responsibility, for management, gave two strong reasons why
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West Broadway would also not be a likely site for tenant
management. Like residents at Orchard Park and Charlestown,
West Broadway leaders are relatively satisfied with management
at the site and don't want the burden of managing themselves.
According to one prominent leader, "We don't have too many
problems. We've been lucky; even though the managers change so
much, we've gotten along with all of them."
Even though West Broadway resident leaders are
experienced and skilled enough to suggest strong TMC"directors
and staff, those leaders simply have no interest in managing.
Expressing the same sentiment as Charlestown leaders, one West
Broadway leader insisted, "we don't want to get into
evictions. Confidentiality is important and its just not our
business." Also leaders expressed the attitude that even
though there was little conflict or in-fighting at present, a
TMC would lead to a conflict situation. One leader commented,
"Managers would have more enemies than friends." Another
added, "Poor people are always fighting each other. It is hard
to see somebody getting somewhere when you are getting
nowhere. The attitude would be 'who the hell is she to tell me
what to do when her kids do such and such.'" (West Broadway
interviews, April 1986)
The West Broadway task force does have more input and
hands-on participation in management at the site than at any
other Boston development except Bromley-Heath. Task force
members by contract are. responsible for judging transfers and
relocations. This participation is both a blessing and curse
in considering West Broadway for tenant management. While it
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has provided leaders with management experience it has also
co-opted leaders to a level of satisfaction both with local
management staff and with their level of involvement with
that staff.
5)Franklin Field -- This development is smaller than the
previous four. It occupies a low-income, mostly Black
neighborhood of Dorchester. Franklin Field was selected as
one of the study sites because its well-organized and vocal
task force has actively expressed its dissatisfaction with
site management and because it is currently the focus of BHA
redevelopment funding. The resident displeasure with current
BHA management at the site led to the task force formation of
a tenant maintenance committee and the drafting of a
management plan in 1984.
The Franklin Field Management Plan, prepared by task
force members and endorsed by BHA staff, sets out specific
standards and procedures for management and maintenance
delivery. It requires the active participation of residents
in the hiring and firing of personnel, in tenant selection and
eviction, and in setting budget priorities. The 40-page
document includes a set of resident responsibilities or
community rules, and a plan for tenant orientation sessions.
It also outlines a set of preventive and corrective
maintenance procedures, occupancy standards, new rent
collection guidelines, and a revised eviction policy.
(Franklin Field Management Plan, 1984)
This thesis will recommend that the BHA turn over
management to a TMC at Franklin Field according to a
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timetable in which implementation of the management plan
serves as a transition to tenant management at the site. This
recommendation comes with some reservations about the
likelihood of a TMC's success, but is made for two reasons.
One, resident work in preparing and beginning the initial
stages of implementing the management plan sets in motion a
useful transition toward tenant management. The assumption of
additional responsibility short of actual tenant management is
similar to the Jersey City and St' Louis situations. Second,
Franklin Field satisfies the eight pre-conditions for tenant
management outlined in the previous chapter.
Task force leaders and staff at the development
acknowledge that the management plan, if it is successful,
could lead to eventual TMC management at the site. One leader
commented, "Our work on the maintenance committee is not
really like being a TMC. We talked about it but we needed
some experience first. We do have a right to managing our own
development. Mangement here has been lousy for years."
(Franklin Field interviews, April 1986)
While there is not evidence of widespread resident
interest in taking over management at Franklin Field, the
expression of interest by top leaders seems sufficient to
satisfy the first pre-condition. The second, dissatisfaction
with current management conditions, is clearly met at the
site. According to one task forcd leader, "We've had managers
here who don't care. I think we should manage here, because
you need someone who cares. Mildred Hailey over at (Bromley-
Heath) is a darn good manager, and it couldbe just like that
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here." (Franklin Field interviews, April 1986)
The organizational potential at Franklin Field is
evidenced by resident work on the maintenance committee and in
preparing the management report. The fourth pre-condition is
less obviously satisfied. There are a few visible task force
leaders who conceivably could fill the role of resident
manager, but none with the level of experience and leadership
skills of a Mildred Hailey or a Kimi Gray. There is enough
potential and desire among the few relatively inexperienced
leaders to take the chance that those skills will emerge
through the training process and initial managing experience.
Modernization funding has been committed to Franklin
Field, so the only remaining pre-condition to consider is the
somewhat elusive one considering the fabric of the community.
Here again the call could go either way. Some leaders
mentioned divisions within the community while others claimed
a strong level of cohesiveness built on years of struggle with
the BHA. The conclusion here is that there is not enough
evidence to exclude the otherwise strong potential for tenant
management at Franklin Field based on community
considerations.
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XII. CONCLUSION
It is clear from the above analysis of five Boston
developments that a combination of very special circumstances
needs to exist to even consider tenant management at a local
public housing development. Even if those circumstances exist
there is no guarantee that they won't change or that other
factors won't lead to a negative outcome. Tenant management
represents a tremendous amount of work for residents, but can
also provide new hope and opportunity at previously-troubled
developments.
It is important to understand clearly the tremendous
burden and potential which tenant management represents since
it is currently being promoted and implemented in seven new
cities. In six of the cities, tenant management is being
promoted as a transition to eventual tenant homeownership of
units as part of a new national demonstration project. That
the concept of poor people managing their own living situation
is being embraced by the conservative Reagan administration
should serve as both a window of opportunity and as a warning
flag to residents in cities considering the model. At least
one advocate and practitioner of tenant management from the
sixties finds no inconsistency in Reagan and the Right's
support. According to Bertha Gilkey, "I call it peopleism not
Reaganism. It just makes so much sense. They (conservatives)
believe in self-sufficiency and local control and we just
believe in the same thing. As poor people we need to do more
than just talk. We need to go make it happen." (Gilkey
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interview, April 1986)
Tenant management will not solve the many problems in
troubled central city public housing developments. In the 25
years since the first TMC/LHA management contract was signed
at Bromley-Heath in 1971, less than 20 TMCs have survived. At
those developments, however, the results, some of which have
been documented above, have been dramatic enough to suggest
that tenant management can provide significant remedies at
developments in which certain pre-conditions, as listed above,
are satisfied.
It can be argued based that TMCs perform traditional
management functions more efficiently than local housing
authorities. The benefits of tenant management go well beyond
the day-to-day repair of property and collection of rent which
TMCs must perform. The collective and individual empowerment
of public housing residents in Boston, Jersey City, Washington
is reason enough to recommend tenant management at additional
sites. TMCs' capacity for developing a renewed hope and
optimism in what Bertha Gilkey calls, "the urban jungle" of
urban public housing, and for promoting supportive services
further suggest its implementation at developments where the
pre-conditions are found.
The most important legacy of tenant management may be
that the success of TMCs has proven that poor people can
manage themselves. Not only have poor and minority residents
managed, but they have also succeeded where professionals and
bureaucrats have failed. Developments in St. Louis, Boston,
and Jersey City faced demolition when LHAs turned over
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management to residents. Residents in those cities not only
escaped the wrecking ball, but succeeded in implementing
economic development programs and supportive services designed
to assist tenants with limited or no access to jobs and escape
from welfare-dependancy.
One lesson for developments and LHAs which will not
consider tenant management is that there are intermediate
steps short of actual tenant management which can improve
local site management. Those intermediate steps can involve
an increased resident role in specific management tasks or a
better organized resident group holding LHA managers better
accountable on delivery of services. In either case the
critical element is active resident involvement in site
management short of actual tenant management.
Another significant result of tenant management that is
not often mentioned in the literature is the development of
leaders and spokespersons among the very poor residents of
public housing. TMC leaders like Mildred Hailey, Kimi Gray,
and Bertha Gilkey travel around the country speaking out on
behalf of public housing residents' right to self-management
and self-improvement. It should be mentioned that every TMC
leader cited in this thesis is Black, and that all but Rev.
Blount are women. Black women have had limited access to
positions of leadership and power in this country. Tenant
management has provided a rare avenue to develop leaders and
spokespersons among Black women.
For all these reasons it is important that public housing
residents and housing authority staff around the country look
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closely at local sites for evidence of potential for tenant
management. The original goals for tenant management, which
included the empowerment of low-income residents must not be
forgotten during a time when the Reagan administration is
promoting the same policy approach with different goals in
mind. Following this prescription won't have a great impact
on the livability of urban public housing, but should mean
additional local success stories for the 1990s.
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